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This dissertation examines the influence of internal and external actors in 
pressuring Kenya to embrace liberalization during the Moi presidency. It argues that 
internal actors had more influence than external actors such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in forcing the Moi government to concede to 
liberalization. To make its argument, the dissertation analyzes the influence of Kenya‘s 
colonial history, Harambee (self-help groups), the economic decline of the 1970s and 
1980s, ethnic rivalry, and the role of Moi‘s repressive regime in bringing about 
liberalization. It uses Kenya‘s agricultural and financial sectors as case studies to explain 
how the influence of these actors/factors contributed to liberalization. The dissertation 
concludes by emphasizing why it is important to seriously consider the role of internal 
actors when examining liberalization (or any other reform policies). One reason is that 
the ―on-the-ground‖ actors are primary in determining whether or not a policy can even 
be implemented, let alone succeed. In that respect, the dissertation recommends that 
international financial institutions consult with all domestic actors, including political and 
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INTRODUCTION, REVIEW OF LITERATURE, METHODOLOGY, 
STRUCUTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 
Why did Kenya embrace political and economic liberalization during the 
period of its second postcolonial president, Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002)? What 
factors in the colonial and postcolonial history of Kenya played into the decision to 
embrace liberalization? To what extent did external actors such as the World Bank 
and International Monetary Fund (IMF) play a part in pressuring the Moi 
government to embrace the policies and practices of liberalization? 
 
These questions are an attempt to engage in the broad discussion in the 
literature on policy diffusion and policy implementation. From the 1980s to the 
present, this discussion has centered on whether internal or external actors have more 
influence in forcing states to embrace the policies and practices of liberalization. In 
the case of Kenya during the Moi government, this dissertation argues that internal 
actors and factors were the primary drivers that forced President Moi to concede to 
liberalization while the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
donor countries played a secondary role. In other words, the real drivers of Kenya‘s 




things were and wanting change in the form of political openness and economic 
opportunity.  
 
Three factors helped galvanize the efforts of the internal actors. The first 
factor was the economic decline that Kenya experienced under the Daniel arap Moi 
government. The second factor was President Moi‘s effort to restrict opposition to 
his government by repression and amending Kenya‘s Constitution to make it a one-
party system. The third factor was the intense ethnic rivalry between the Kalenjin 
tribe and the Kikuyu tribe, the Kalenjin represented by President Moi and the Kikuyu 
represented by his predecessor, President Jomo Kenyatta. This rivalry was 
manifested in President Moi‘s use of public policy to marginalize the Kikuyu 
political and business elites, whose resentment helped fuel the reform movement. 
 
The path to liberalization in Kenya, however, presents to scholars and 
observers of Kenyan politics a number of interesting challenges because of the 
country‘s idiosyncrasies. To most scholars, the path to liberalization starts at 
economic crises that lead countries directly to the doors of western donors—be they 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or countries—that have money to loan if the recipient 
countries follow their rules. While Kenya began the path to liberalization in the usual 
way – economic crises and trips to the donor institutions for financial aid– it did not 




through loans and technical assistance, but they often walked away in frustration by 
the government‘s constant reneging on conditionality terms and unwillingness to 
implement their policy recommendations. There are lessons to be learned from an 
examination of Kenya‘s unique journey toward liberalization, which was often 
fractious, but ultimately a largely successful journey. 
 
 
1.1 Review of the Literature 
 
This dissertation‘s argument that internal actors and factors were more 
influential in driving Kenya toward liberalization than were external actors runs 
counter to the dominant views in the literature. The dominant views on the diffusion 
of liberalization throughout the developing world largely converge on a consensus 
that the primary drivers of liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s were external actors 
and that internal actors were secondary, or merely served as receptacles of ideas 
from the international actors. The advocates of the external-actors-as-the-drivers of 
liberalization posit that reform policies were designed in Washington, D.C. and other  
capitals of the developed world and imposed on Africa. African countries could not 
refuse the externally imposed reform policies because their acceptance was a 
condition for receiving financial assistance, assistance they desperately needed 





Maclean (1997) argues that liberalization was a Western-dominated model 
imposed on African states by international financial institutions. For Maclean, the 
liberalization agenda, which included reducing the size of government, privatization 
of state-owned enterprises, and good governance, sounded exactly the same as the 
debates of the 1960s and 1970s when the West was pushing various forms of 
development models. She sees the discourse around liberalization in the context of 
unequal north-south relations; thus, in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, one cannot 
divorce how African states have been ―influenced by the diffusion of ideologies from 
outside [and that] their marginal position in the global economy […] has reduced 
their ability to resist the pressures of dominant international financial actors‖ 
(Maclean 1997:138).  
 
By the early 2000s, the voices of many of those excoriating western-based 
institutions for leading the march of liberalism became more amplified. Amin (2004) 
compares liberalism to a ―virus‖ born in the west and spread to other countries and  
cultures by the West. Woods (2006) notes that the IMF and the World Bank have 
forced many countries to open their economies to international trade, investment, and 
capital flows. Such pressure to force developing countries to adopt liberalizing 
reforms comes in ―various ways, from the subtle to the overt: through the threat or 
use of physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and benefits, and even 
through the monopolization of information and expertise‖ (Simmons, Dobbin, and 





Liberalization through policy conditionality requires that a member country 
must agree to adopt a given set of policies in return for financial assistance from the 
World Bank and/or the IMF. In this sense, conditionality is to be understood as the 
promise of financial assistance to countries by these external actors if the countries 
agree to embrace liberalization. Fearon (1988) calls conditionality ―coercion‖ 
because in the 1980s countries sought financial assistance from the IMF and/or the 
World Bank during economic crises and therefore had no bargaining leverage. Other 
scholars use similar lines of argument as Fearon by saying that the developing 
countries lacked leverage to negotiate with the donor institutions because they were 
forced to decide whether to accept the conditions under economic, political, and 
social stress caused by the crises they were facing at the time. Clearly unwilling to 
let their economies collapse, they accepted the demands or conditions the institutions 
imposed (Harrison 2005; Stallings 1992). According to Mosley, one of the earliest 
scholars to argue that international donors have been the drivers of liberalizing 
reforms: 
 
This pressure [to adopt liberalization] originally came in the form of 
words, which asked above all for a lifting of controls on exchange 
rates and agricultural prices. More recently, however, the pressure for 
liberalization has come with teeth in the form of ‗policy 
conditionality,‘ that is, of refusals by aid donors to disburse 
development aid unless specific changes in economic policy are made 





Those who argue that external forces are the drivers of liberalization often 
cite market liberalization to create competition, which forces countries to become 
more efficient and thus more competitive, an example of reform through 
conditionality. This logic is based on the premise that there are limited markets for 
goods and capital and that states that want access to such markets must adopt 
policies that create incentives for domestic and international investors as well as 
make their products competitive compared to other states. Such competitiveness is 
achieved by adopting market-friendly policies preferred by the international 
creditors. Again, this explanation of African governments‘ reform centered on 
pressures from external forces as the countries faced the economic crises of the 
1980s. As Rodrik posits: 
[The 1980s was] a decade of great leverage for these institutions vis-
a-vis debtor governments, especially where poorer African countries 
are concerned. The trade policy recommendations of the World Bank 
were adopted by cash-starved governments frequently with little 
conviction of their ultimate benefits (Rodrik 1992:89). 
 
The African countries were overly dependent on the donor institutions for 
loans and credits, including debt cancellation, and thus were under pressure to follow 
the external actors‘ policy recommendations. The countries were in need of 
development financing which was critical for long-term investment in projects and 
for overall development. They were also in need of credits and long-term lending 
from commercial banks and having the approval of the IFIs made it easier for them 




including relief from their debt burden, made them vulnerable to pressures from the 
international creditors, which then caused them to reform and liberalize their trade 
policies (Helleiner 1983). Kenya did face financial challenges as its economy was in 
a downturn due in part to the oil shocks of the 1970s and sought financial assistance 
from the World Bank and IMF. 
 
Many of these explanations were made in the context of the fall of the Soviet 
Union. The collapse of the Soviet bloc marked the triumph of liberalism and freed 
the Western-based donor institutions from the constraints of East-West political  
rivalry. The triumph of liberalism gave rise to an international march toward 
economic and political reforms particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (Epstein 
2008). When Africa joined this march in the early 1990s, it was an affirmation of the 
notion that there was no alternative to liberalism (Eyoh 1996; Joseph 1992). Some of 
the proponents of this view often point to legislation in the United States Congress as 
an indication of external actors‘ pressure on developing countries to embrace 
liberalization. For example, in 1990, Senator Edward Kennedy‘s aid legislation for 
Kenya was ―explicitly tied to human rights improvement.‖ In early 1991, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) announced that it would 
increase its direct assistance to countries that were adopting political and economic 
liberalization (Mailafia 1997:31). There was no indication that these types of 





While at some level the explanations that point to external pressure as the 
driver of reform are useful and offer important insights about the influence of 
external actors in liberalization in Africa, they are nonetheless limited. They cover 
the impact of factors such as ―inappropriate‖ economic policies on the process of 
liberalization but are limited in terms of explaining the process of liberalization that 
emerged in response to internal circumstances involving tribal groups struggling to 
take control of the state, the primary means by which access to political power and 
economic resources is gained.  
 
The explanation that emphasized conditionality and countries‘ desperation 
for debt relief holds some merit. This argument did not hold for Kenya, however, 
because Kenya was not among the IMF‘s Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) 
Initiative and, therefore, it was not eligible for debt cancellation at the time (Joseph 
2002). The explanation that conditionality forced developing states to liberalize their 
markets and compete for gains from international trade and investment also would be 
difficult with respect to Kenya. Trade reform in Kenya (as in the developing world in 
general) has always been met with skepticism on the part of both the public and 
private sectors. Both sectors relied heavily on the state for different forms of 
assistance and would be highly skeptical of such an imposition from the outside.  
 
Observers sometimes ask why there has not been much comparison between 




respect to the spread or the effects of liberalization. Swinnen et al. (2010) compared 
the performance of liberalization in these regions and found major internal 
differences. For example, they found that economic growth was initially stronger in 
Africa than in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union because 
Africa did not have a capital-intensive farming system prior to reform; therefore, it 
did not suffer ―the decline in output and productivity that accompanied land reform 
and privatization‖ that took place in these former communist states (432). Also, 
liberalization improved price incentives in Africa while it worsened them in the 
former communist states (Swinnen, Vandeplas, and Maerten 2010). The desire for 
greater price incentives was one of the reasons that small-scale farmers and business 
groups were agitating for reform in Kenya. 
 
While it is reasonable and important to compare the performance of 
liberalization in the different regions as a way to improve our knowledge, the same 
cannot be done or applied to specific countries. The experience of Kenya differed 
from countries in Central and Eastern Europe during the transition from communism 
to democracy. Kenya never had a communist tradition and therefore their paths 
toward liberalization cannot be compared. 
 
Focusing on internal actors and highlighting the limitations of the 
explanations that emphasize external actors as the drivers of liberalization is not to 




was secondary and that the interaction was very complicated.  In some cases, their 
interaction helped lead to liberalization and in other cases their interaction hampered 
progress toward liberalization. For example, the announcement of the international 
community to suspend quick-disbursement loans to the Kenyan government in 1991 
may have been the final blow that pushed the government to consider multi-party 
elections even as the Moi government was nearing collapse under the weight of 
domestic popular pressure. When the IMF offered to help the government write 
legislation, the internal actors refused and the process toward liberalization suffered 
because the government pointed to such overt offer of assistance as external 
meddling and sought to discredit the internal actors who were agitating for the 
reforms. In both instances, however, the internal actors were primary and external 
actors were secondary in the final decision.  
 
The three factors – ethnic rivalry, economic decline, and political repression 
and corruption – are interrelated and linked to Kenya‘s colonial history and legacy. 
The country‘s colonial history and legacy created an environment in which domestic 
actors had particular influences on policy changes, in this case political and 
economic policy changes toward liberalization. The colonial legacy left an ethnic 
divide that subsequent leaders easily exploited. Because of this historical context, 
any movement toward political and economic reform could only take place in the 






1.2 Definition of Terms 
 
The concept of liberalization is the operational term in the study. While there 
is no consensus on a specific definition of liberalization, there are some features that 
are generally understood to define what it means to have a liberal political and 
economic system. The main political features include the existence of more than one 
political party with free and fair competition among them in periodic elections, 
respect for the freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly, and respect for human 
rights (Makinda 1996). Economic liberalization, on the other hand, involves 
deregulation of financial and labor markets, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
elimination of marketing boards, and free trade policies and practices, which involve 
reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies to producers and consumers, and 
removal of tariffs and other market-distorting barriers (Berman 1998). 
 
These characterizations of political and economic liberalization align with the 
Washington Consensus, often referred to as neo-liberalism, as clarified by John 
Williamson in 1989. The terms ―reforms‖ or ―liberalizing reforms‖ used herein to 
refer to any policy change that reduces government controls in the economy or 
political system in favor of increasing the role of free market forces or giving the 





lifted controls on foreign exchange transactions and moved from a one-party system 
to a multiparty system, for example, both were liberalizing reforms.   
 
 
1.3 Case Selection 
 
Among the former British colonies in East Africa, Kenya had the best chance 
to succeed economically after independence and hence to spare its people much of 
the poverty they endure today. Kenya had the best chance of success in part because 
of the way in which its economy was structured compared to Uganda and Tanzania, 
for example. Kenya had a settler economy based on both large- and small-scale 
agriculture with a strong emphasis on private markets with a comparatively 
sophisticated financial system. The country had an orderly handover from the 
colonial authorities to the newly selected then elected Kenyan leaders.  
 
In Uganda, the British helped develop a peasant economy led by a class of 
feudal landlords and the country fell into political paralysis leading to a prolonged 
civil war by 1971. Tanzania‘s system, first put in place by German settlers (1885-
1916), emphasized small farmer coffee production (Samoff and Samoff 1976) and 
persisted after the end of German rule but the British ―never managed to impose 
successfully the constraints on smallholder production and marketing that were 




Following independence, Tanzania adopted ujamaa (socialism) and Uganda 
essentially collapsed.  
 
Kenya, on the other hand, ―pursued a strategy that emphasized economic 
growth over equity that built upon the institutions and policies inherited from the 
colonial era.‖ It emphasized the importance of the private sector to the economy. It 
―expanded production of [its] two principal export crops – coffee and tea – for which 
Kenya enjoyed a comparative advantage in world markets and which could be grown 
by small farmers; and receptivity to foreign private investment‖ (Barkan 1994:5). 
Clearly the notion of liberalization was not foreign to Kenya in the 1980s and 1990s 
and it remains puzzling to see many studies crediting external forces as the primary 
drivers of liberalization in Kenya in these two decades.  
 
The agricultural and financial sectors were selected as case studies for this 
research because they have been closely linked in Kenya‘s history. The colonial 
government heavily recruited foreign banks to help finance settler agriculture and the 
Kenya-Uganda railway to ease transportation to increase trade in the late 1890s. 
When the banks did not finance agriculture to the level that the colonial government 
expected, the colonial government established the Land and Agriculture Bank to 
finance settler agriculture. After independence, the Land and Agriculture Bank and 
other financial institutions were transferred to the newly independent government, 






The two sectors have remained very important to Kenya‘s economy. Twenty 
percent of Kenya‘s gross domestic product comes from the agricultural sector, and 
more than 80 percent of the population live in rural areas and derive their 
livelihoods, directly or indirectly, from agriculture. The financial sector is a key part 
of the country‘s service sector, which contributes over 60 percent of Kenya‘s gross 
domestic product.
1
 Lastly, it was small-scale farmers and business elites who called 
for liberalization of markets and joined together to demand privatization and other 
reforms in agricultural marketing boards and state-owned financial institutions and 
other parastatals. 
 
Ultimately, the dissertation seeks to illuminate policymakers and policy-
making institutions to better understand the particular circumstances of Kenya and 
how internal and external actors interacted either to produce or undermine expected 
outcomes. The way the different actors and factors contributed to liberalization in 
Kenya should be understood as modeled in Figure 1 below.  
  
                                                 
1United States Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. The World Factbook (Washington, 
D.C.).<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>. Accessed 










Figure 1: Conceptual Overview of the Liberalizing Process in Kenya 
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Historical Context serves to contextualize the factors that contribute to a 
country‘s prospect of embracing political and economic liberalization, most notably 
its history and culture and, in the case of Kenya, its postcolonial political and 
economic development strategy. The culture of the tribal society, which emphasized 
collective ownership of land, contextualizes the tension that later developed around 
the establishment of private property laws and the rivalries among Kenya‘s tribal 
communities and how these rivalries contributed to the extent to which Kenya 
achieved liberalization.  
 
The Pre-liberalizing Stage refers to economic and political conditions that 
existed in both the colonial and post-colonial administrations through the first multi-
party elections in 1992. To varying degrees, the colonial administration being the 
most severe, governance was undemocratic during this period. Policies were unjust 
and inequitable with respect to different ethnic groups and social classes. Favoritism 
in political positions and levels of representation in the legislative council and 
national parliament was manifest: in the colonial time by the settlers and under 
Presidents Kenyatta and Moi by their respective ethnic groups. All three 
administrations practiced political repression and policies that were anathema to 






The effect of these policies and practices was to create economic, political, 
and social conditions that became untenable to the population and served as stimuli 
for reform. These conditions, which became the underlying factors that helped 
precipitate a reform movement, included tensions between settlers and indigenous 
Kenyans and among different ethnic groups in Kenya. Even in the colonial period, 
popular complaints against the colonial government led to the deadly Mau Mau 
rebellion. Economically, Kenya suffered deep declines beginning in the mid-1970s 
and lasting through the 1980s. The economic deterioration exacerbated the political 
rivalry that existed primarily between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin tribal groups. 
President Moi became increasingly authoritarian, causing intense political tension 
between the government and government critics and potential political opposition. 
Subsequent popular discontent led to public demonstrations against the Moi 
government, placing him in the first wave of independence leaders in Africa ever to 
face their populations in the streets.  
 
The internal pressure against President Moi came primarily from the Kikuyu 
and Luo ethnic communities, especially small-scale farmers, the business and 
professional classes which he sought to marginalize through consolidation of 
political power and advancing the interests of his Kalenjin tribal group and allies at 
the expense of the other communities. A combination of economic hardship, political 






The external pressure on the Moi government came from the IMF/World 
Bank and donor countries as the economy deteriorated and internal actors agitated 
for reform. The donors provided financial assistance and made policy 
recommendations. For sure the IMF/World Bank had some influence  by virtue of 
their capability to provide financial assistance, but they were often frustrated by 
Kenya‘s lack of progress in following their advice. The dissertation focuses on the 
IMF/World Bank without singling out particular major donor countries because of 
the closeness of the two donor institutions and the necessary approval that the 
member countries must first give to loans and credits to countries. 
 
The Liberalizing Stage refers to the point at which both the political and 
economic systems began to open to competition. The Constitutional ban on 
opposition parties was repealed, multiparty elections were held, and judicial tenure 
restored. The government also reduced controls on foreign investors and 
international trade and privatized state-owned banks and many other parastatals, all 












This is an historical narrative and interpretation of selected periods, actors, 
policies, and events in Kenya‘s political and economic history with the goal of 
explicating how these various actors and events led to Kenya becoming a more 
liberalized economy during its first three decades of independence. Data collection 
was done through desk and field research. Desk research involved examining journal 
articles, books, reports, and newspapers obtained from libraries at the University of 
Denver, Colorado State University, Howard University, and American University as 
well as the IMF/World Bank Joint library in Washington, D.C. and from online 
sources (web-based publications).  
 
Field research was conducted in July and August 2010 in Kenya, including 
visits to the national archives and the library at the University of Nairobi. Data were 
gathered through interviews with three professors at the University of Nairobi; the 
Director of the Tegemeo Institute at Egerton University; two representatives of the 
Kenya Investment Authority; a business advisor for Fusion Capital, a fund that 
finances small and medium-size private enterprises in East Africa; and a practicing 
lawyer. In addition, interviews were conducted with a Program Officer at the 
Institute of Economic Affairs and two representatives from two different non-profit 





The interviews were semi-structured with open-ended questions around the 
nature of the debates within the government pertaining to adopting certain liberal 
policies and the role of internal and external actors. Key informants were largely 
selected through the process of snowball sampling, whereby ―the researcher accesses 
informants through contact information that is provided by other informants‖ (Noy 
2008:330). All of the interviews lasted from one to more than three hours.    
 
In addition, informal interviews were conducted with a number of ordinary 
professional people throughout Nairobi. These interviews were obtained by 
approaching people leaving work at the end of the workday and asking them for a 
few minutes. After explaining the project, several agreed ―to have coffee and talk.‖ 
Since the time of field research, follow-up conversations with one of the informants 
have occurred over email. 
 
Explaining the dominant role of domestic actors in forcing an authoritarian 
state to concede to reform is not always easy for researchers. It was difficult in 
Kenya particularly because the Moi government restricted popular opposition 
politics. Because of legal restrictions on opposition politics, anti-government efforts 
could not take organizational form. Opposition efforts had to be vague in their 
programmatic content to avoid government censorship (Holmquist, Weaver, Ford 




Kenya, one has to look at events and examine their contribution in the context of 
Kenyan political and economic history and development.  
 
Examining particular events for their contribution in terms of putting pressure 
on the state requires a micro-level analysis. The resignation of an obscure minister, 
for example, or the murder of an activist, or protests by mothers of political prisoners 
at a specific street corner may not be considered important in a macro analysis of 
factors that bring pressure on the state to reform. Seemingly minor events are not 
likely to be captured by macro-level approaches and therefore tend to go unnoticed 
in the international relations literature with regard to why countries have embraced 
liberalization. In this context, while an observer from afar who uses a macro-analysis 
―may easily conclude that international pressures are the key to reforms, quite an 
opposite conclusion may be reached through a micro-analysis, or case study 
approach‖ (Press 2005:14).  
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The remainder of the dissertation is presented in five additional chapters. 
Chapter Two provides a contextual overview of Kenya‘s political, economic, and 
social history. The chapter examines the relations among the various ethnic and tribal 




liberalization in Kenya from the pre- and colonial period (1822-1963) through the 
Jomo Kenyatta presidency (1963-1978).  
 
The chapter highlights the role and influence of customary traditions in 
promoting or discouraging the notion of private property rights, a key feature of 
liberalization and how pre-independence, tribal-affiliated associations served as the 
catalyst for national political parties in postcolonial Kenya‘s liberalization 
movement. Evolving from local politics to national politics, the parties nonetheless 
remained tribal and parochial, a factor that remains at the center of current Kenyan 
political and economic affairs and continues to foment intense rivalry among the 
most politically active ethnic groups.  
 
Chapter Three explores the period of Kenya‘s second president, Daniel arap 
Moi, and explicates how economic decline, corruption, repression in Harambee, and 
ethnic rivalry created the conditions that led domestic actors to mobilize popular 
pressure against his government for political and economic reform. This chapter 
illustrates the relatively limited role of external actors but how, through their 
financial power, they served as a complement to the domestic reform pressures that 
were being exerted on the government. It was this type of interaction (alliance) that 






Chapters Four and Five narrow the focus of liberalizing reform in Kenya and 
examine in detail the reform process in the agricultural and financial sectors, 
respectively. In presenting the sector analyses, each chapter examines the relative 
contributions of internal and external factors in bringing about sector reform.  
 
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation with a summary discussion of the 
relative contributions of domestic politics and external pressure as drivers of 
liberalizing reform in Kenya and notes the value for funders and policy-makers in 











HISTORY AND PRESSURES FOR LIBERALIZATION 
 
 
Glaring disparities in Kenya's land wealth began with British 
colonialists, who forcibly removed thousands of families from lush 
highlands so white farmers could grow coffee and tea. Rather than 
unwind the disputes after winning independence, Kenya's founding 
fathers compounded the injustices, helping themselves to the departing 
colonialists' spoils and even continuing forced resettlement schemes. 
Every Kenyan president has been accused of accumulating massive 
land holdings, diverting public properties to his tribe members and 
doling out real estate titles like candy to win votes. The family of Jomo 
Kenyatta, Kenya's George Washington, sits on half a million acres, 
while his successor, Daniel [a]rap Moi, holds more than 100,000 acres, 
a government commission found. Current President Mwai Kibaki owns 





This chapter presents a historical overview and a review of the political and 
economic actors and factors that shaped Kenya‘s liberalization process. One of the 
most important domestic factors that this chapter highlights is the impact of 
traditional customs on the development of policies regarding land tenure or private 
property rights, a key feature of liberalization. Three distinct but interrelated periods 
in Kenya‘s history have shaped the context of its liberalization trajectory: the pre-
colonial period until independence in 1963 and the period of its first post-
independence president, Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), and the period of the 
                                                 




presidency of the Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002). The period of President Moi‘s 
administration is covered in Chapter Three. This chapter discusses how strong 
reactions among various internal actors against undemocratic policies and practices 
during the first of those two periods led to popular pressure on the state, which then 
had to reform. This historical overview and discussions of Kenya‘s different tribal 
groups provide context for understanding why given ethnic groups may favor state 
intervention in the economy at a particular time.  
 
Kenya borders the East African nations of Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Sudan. With a total area of 580,367 square kilometers (197,000 square 
miles), Kenya is roughly twice the size of the U.S. State of Nevada. Its population is 
made up of many tribes whose members are farmers, agro-pastoralists, and 
pastoralists. The farmers are concentrated in the fertile Rift Valley, west of Kenya‘s 
capital city, Nairobi; the Central Province districts; and the coastal plains. The major 
tribes engaging in farming are the Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya. Agro-pastoralist tribes 
are those that also raise livestock in addition to farming, including the Kalenjin who 
live in the Rift Valley. The Maasai tribe is nomadic pastoralist and lives along the 
arid and semi-arid regions of the north and northwest, parts of the lower Rift Valley, 
and Central Province. The tribal makeup of Kenyan society has played an important 
role in whether and how liberalization policies were implemented, a role that dates to 





Table 1 below, based on Kenya‘s most recent census, provides a sense of the 
political districts and general concentration of the country‘s 11 largest tribes. Having 
a sense of where the ethnic groups are concentrated is important for later discussions 
of how Presidents Kenyatta and Moi prioritized different areas of the country with 
regard to public policy. There are more than forty tribes in Kenya, only the 11 listed 
below have populations greater than 250,000 members (Barkan 2011; Oparanya 
2010). 
 
Table 1: Kenya 2009 Census (Population: 38,610,097) 
 
Tribe Population Percent  Political District 
Kikuyu 6,622,576  17.2 Central Province & Nairobi 
Luhya 5,338,666  13.8 Western Province 
Kalenjin 4,967,328 12.9 West Rift Valley Province 
Luo 4,044,440 10.5 Nyanza Province 
Kamba 3,893,157 10.1 Eastern Province 
Kenyan Somali 2,385,572 6.2 North Eastern Province 
Kisii 2,205,669 5.7 Nyanza Province 
Mijikenda 1,960,574 5.1 Coast Province 
Meru 1,658,108 4.3 Eastern Province 
Turkana 988,592 2.6 Northern Rift Valley 
Maasai 841,622 2.2 Rift Valley/Central Province 










2.1  Pre-colonial Kenya 
 
Before Britain‘s arrival in the region in 1822, Kenyan society was 
decentralized and organized around clans and sub-clans. Political authority rested 
primarily within councils of elders, and they exercised their authority in a 
participatory and collegial way. Family units were also important in resolving a 
number of societal matters. Family members would often be called upon to 
participate in the governments in various capacities. Government decisions were 
predictable, as they were made based on traditions and customs. ―The traditions and 
customs collectively underscored the principle of impartiality‖ (Ludeki 2007:237).  
 
This brief account of pre-colonial social relations and political structure is 
not, of course, intended to suggest that pre-colonial Kenya was politically and 
socially equitable even though some scholars argue that the decentralized nature of 
some of Kenyan societies in the pre-colonial period made them egalitarian. They 
pointed to communal ownership of land as an example of egalitarianism (Fortes and 
Pritchard 1940; summarized in Ludeki [2007]). As Ludeki (2007) notes, land was the 
property of the clan or family. Every male member of the clan was to be given a 
piece of land once he reached adulthood. However, ―an individual land ‗owner‘ 
could not extend land rights to a stranger without the approval of the clan‖ (238). In 
pastoral tribal communities, while individual family owned livestock, grazing fields 





A key feature of tribal life in pre-colonial Kenya was the community tradition 
of Harambee. The term is defined as the ―collective and cooperative participation of 
a community in an attempt to fill perceived needs through utilization of its own 
resources‖(Ngau 1987:524). Traditionally, Harambee organizations were small self-
formed groups that met to plan and work on projects to benefit either a household or 
a community. Members worked in rotating fashion. They made decisions 
collaboratively and through consensus. It was a basic, grassroots effort at community 
development. Ngau (1987) noted that prior to the current individual- and market-
influenced pattern of resource allocation and ownership, Harambee was a means for 
communities to exchange labor and assistance and the efforts were oriented toward 
addressing basic needs. 
 
 
2.2  Colonial Kenya 
 
The British first arrived in Kenya in 1822 when Seyyid Said, the Omani 
Emperor, attacked Mombasa, Pate, and Pemba, which were ruled at that time by the 
Mazui clan. To protect the clan, the Mazui appealed to the British for help, resulting 
in British protectorate over Mombasa, Kenya‘s major port city. By the late 19
th
 
Century, Britain had solidified its presence in the region and in 1895, Kenya became 




Africa. East Africa proved convenient for Britain because it linked with India 
(Britain‘s largest colony) through the Indian Ocean (Wolff 1970). As the 19
th
 
Century drew to a close, Britain‘s industrial power status faced increasing 
competitive pressures from countries such as Germany, France, Belgium, and the 
United States, so its territorial possessions became even more important sources of 
food and raw materials. Britain moved swiftly to secure its territorial possessions 
through the construction of a major railway to facilitate imports and exports.  
 
In 1896, construction on the Kenya-Uganda railway, linking the interiors of 
the two countries to the Indian Ocean at the port city Mombasa, was begun. By 1901, 
the railway reached Kisumu, Kenya‘s third major city, on Lake Victoria and linked 
Kenya and Uganda through the port city of Mombasa and the Indian Ocean. This 
linking of these territorial possessions to increase trade was part of what Wolff 
describes as ―fitting the new Protectorate into the imperial economy‖(1970:275). 
Britain experienced noticeable increases in its imports as a result of these territorial 
linkages. Between 1870 and 1913, Britain imported all raw cotton and a growing 
share of the raw wool that it needed. Wheat and cheese imports had increased 81 
percent; fruit had increased 64 percent; and meat had gone up 42 percent. Among 
food imports, the share from imperial sources increased from 19.8 percent in 1870 to 
30.3 percent in 1913; and raw materials from territorial possessions consistently 






Notwithstanding all the imports and exports made possible by the railway, it 
was an expensive project to build and maintain. Colonial authorities sought to make 
the railroad a self-financed operation by making the countries agriculturally 
productive enough to support both domestic and international markets. Thus 
constructing and maintaining the railway were inextricably linked to Kenya‘s 
agricultural sector, its primary source of revenue. In order to meet the financial 
objectives, the agricultural sector had to be developed and modernized.  
 
To raise revenue to help build the railway, Britain turned to encouraging and 
recruiting settlers into Kenya. As increasing number of settlers arrived in Kenya in 
the early 20
th
 Century, the country‘s best lands were given to them in individual 
freehold under Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915. The Ordinance turned over all the 
territory of the Protectorate to the Commissioner of Kenya (the East African 
Protectorate) and later to the Governor. Soon thereafter, the colonial authorities 
introduced various English property laws to supersede customary laws and make 
legal individual property rights. Africans living in the productive lands in the Rift 
Valley and other provinces were relocated by the colonial authorities to poor-quality 
land areas created and labeled ―Native Reserves‖ by the colonial administrators and 






This process of moving native Africans into these newly created native 
reserves resulted in massive landlessness, land fragmentation, overstocking and 
degradation, as well as ―the disintegration of social and cultural institutions in the 
reserves‖ (Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002:8). The process created landlessness 
because the areas could not accommodate all of the people; it created land 
fragmentation as people sought to carve out small pieces of land to live on. The 
process caused overstocking and degradation as grazing areas became limited, 
causing the land to be overused since the practice of rotation could not be applied. In 
addition, the concept of individual freehold (or individualized land rights) created a 
dual land tenure system. The Native Reserves were under a customary land tenure 
system and subject to a variety of ―statutory restrictions, including prohibition from 
cultivating cash crops,‖ while the confiscated lands given to the settlers operated 
under a statutory individual freehold system, where individual owners made their 
own decisions (Knox 1998:175).  
 
The individual freehold system was said to be superior to the customary 
system for many reasons among them that the freehold system would create a land 
market that settlers could use to help finance their agricultural production. It was 
argued that less efficient farmers would eventually sell their land to more efficient 
farmers who in turn would increase the productivity of the land. For the colonial 
government, the individualized land tenure system would increase Kenya‘s 




increased revenue for the state revenue needed to help finance the railroad. The 
colonial authorities also assumed that those without land would become agricultural 
laborers or urban workers. Statutory restrictions on the native reserves and on 
Africans living outside the native reserves, combined with deprived economic 
conditions resulting from being stripped of their land, political, economic, and social 
rights, created among the indigenous Africans an atmosphere of resentment against 
the settlers (Knox 1998; Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002; Spencer 1981). 
 
The small number of the settlers in Kenya necessitated extensive reliance on 
Africans for labor. The settlers put in place a complex system of institutions and laws 
that forced African males between the ages of 15 and 40 to seek work on European-
owned plantations. The laws included a tax code, a ban on African agricultural 
production, and a registration and identification requirement. The tax system placed 
a heavy burden on African males, especially the legal mandate requiring them to pay 
annual taxes. In an impoverished country such as Kenya, one of the easiest ways, or 
in some cases the only way, to earn the money to pay taxes to the government was to 
work as a laborer on the European-owned plantations. A number of restrictions were 
placed on Kenyan farmers, too. Kenyans were prohibited from growing the most 
lucrative crops, including Arabica coffee. They were also disadvantaged by 
significant differential freight rates of agricultural products vis-à-vis those in the 
settler community. The registration system helped the colonial administrators to 





As the colonial administrators barred political participation by indigenous 
groups and imposed various economic and political restrictions, many political and 
social organizations emerged to contest the restrictions and support their tribal 
communities. Among these early indigenous groups were the Kenya African Union 
(KAU) and the East African Association (EAA), which was forced by the colonial 
government to shut down. As the Colonial Government continued its efforts to clamp 
down on political activities by socio-political groups, the colonial authorities 
declared a state of emergency, at which time KAU was banned and many of its 
leaders arrested. The declaration of the state of emergency was in response to a 
rebellion against the colonial government by nationalist Kenyans in 1953, the 
uprising known as the Mau Mau rebellion (Kanyinga 1998) 
 
 
2.3  Mau Mau Rebellion 
 
Reforms began to happen when popular opposition rose against state policies 
codifying land confiscation and discrimination against Africans, including farmers. 
Mau Mau was a liberalizing movement because at its core were key liberal demands: 
return of or fair compensation for land that was unjustly confiscated, land tenure 
(property) rights equal to the settlers, equal rights to cultivate cash crops and equal 





In response to the rebellion, the colonial government lifted statutory 
restrictions in the native reserves and initiated statutory land tenure reforms, 
allowing individual land titles and rights, as was the case for the settlers. The reforms 
were codified in the 1954 Swynnerton Plan to Intensify African Agriculture. The 
Plan had three phases: adjudication, consolidation, and registration. The adjudication 
phase involved elevating individual ownership rights. The consolidation phase was 
designed to merge small and unviable land units into more economically viable ones 
to facilitate Africans to participate in the market economy. The registration phase 
was to ensure a registry where land titles would be registered under individuals‘ 
names. All of these phases, it was believed, would ultimately reduce disputes over 
land and create land markets. The Swynnerton Plan intended to allow small farmers 
to grow cash crops, and the most fertile lands in the Highlands to be opened to more 
indigenous farmers (Odhiambo and Nyangito 2002; Peterson 1986). 
 
The colonial government had other interests for agreeing to such reforms. 
The colonial government agreed to the reforms because it wanted to increase 
agricultural production for export, as Britain was in great need of raw materials, 
including agricultural products, after the Second World War. It also wanted to 
forestall further political unrest that could damage the economy. According to Knox 
(1998) and Ake (1996), the interests of the colonial government in agreeing to 




to secure colonial political interests through the creation of an elite class of African 
farmers, which would adhere to political moderation because of its interests in the 
economy and as such it would be induced to more or less maintaining a market 
economy.  
 
The nationalist leaders complained that the Swynnerton Plan was not 
sufficient and demanded more reform. In 1961, the colonial government introduced a 
Million Acre Settlement Scheme (MASS) to extend the land tenure reform program 
proposed under Swynnerton. MASS was developed to transfer 470,000 hectares of 
land to 35,000 landless families, with an average size farm of about 12 hectares, at a 
cost of about £30 million. The government also developed systems to provide 
supporting services such as research and extension to farmers. While the nationalist 
Mau Mau rejected the reforms as stipulated in the Swynnerton Plan, they embraced 
and adopted the plan after independence (Ake 1988:123; Knox 1998). 
 
The plan, however, would have presented many problems for the colonial 
government, problems that the independence leaders had to address. Some of the 
problems had to do with the stickiness of customary land tenure in Kenya‘s tribal 
society. For example, what role would the traditional council of elders play in land 
issues in a statutory individualized tenure system? How would the issue of nomadic 
and pastoralist tribes be addressed with respect to land ownership when grazing 




framework for private property rights, contract farming, state and market support for 
the intensification of African agriculture, it did not consider these types of questions 
(Ochieng, 2006). Nonetheless, the Swynnerton Plan became the cornerstone of land 
tenure reform in Kenya after independence, making Kenya a leading state in 
adjudicating land titles and registration of land under individual names.  
 
 
2.4 Emergence of Tribal Politics 
 
A number of other community-based groups emerged during the Mau Mau 
rebellion to help support the movement toward independence. Some of the groups 
were religious orders, which, in addition to opposing the colonial government, 
provided services to their ethnic communities. These emergent tribal groups had 
different factions within them, the more radical of which wanted a complete 
overthrow of the colonial political, social, and economic order, while others sought 
different and more gradual approaches. As the members of these movements devised 
strategies against the colonial state, the groups became the embryos for nationalist 
political factions, which later became political parties. There were members in Mau 
Mau who were less radical and saw the potential to be leaders in post-colonial 
Kenya. Jomo Kenyatta, a member of the Kikuyu tribe, was the leader of this faction, 
and an emerging Kikuyu capitalist class supported him. Some argue that this 




and protect its interests, a position that it believed would allow it to compete with the 
white settler community in post-independence Kenya. This capitalist class became 
very powerful under Kenya‘s first post-independence President, Kenyatta, and the 





These tribal-based associations became centers where political leaders and 
activists in these tribes gathered to discuss strategies to effect political, economic, 
and social change. They also served as the roots for eventual national political parties 
and, as is the main function of political parties, they worked to express the collective 
grievances and demands of the different groups against the colonial order, which 
included the return of expropriated land, an end to political and economic 
discrimination and access to education and other social necessities. The Mau Mau 
rebellion, ―the best-organized expression of the demands of the colonized‖(Kanyinga 
1998:45), caused the colonial state to seek greater control over socio-political 
activities of these groups. One of the ways the colonial government sought to impose 
greater control was to ban national political activities by the groups; the only 
exception was groups sanctioned by the state. 
 
Realizing that political, social, and economic change could not be stopped, 
the colonial authorities began to signal their willingness to negotiate reform. One of 
                                                 




the initial steps was the replacement of the 1922 Constitution with the Lyttelton 
Constitution of 1954, which created a framework for better and increased inclusion 
of Africans in the government and the general political life of Kenya. Even though 
the activities of the African groups expanded considerably, numerous restrictions 
remained, including the continuation of the ban on nationwide political activity by 
socio-political groups. The new constitution led to the first-ever elections in 1957 
that included Africans as candidates and voters for delegates to the Legislative 
Council or LegCo (Kanyinga 1998). 
 
Despite their success in promoting a new constitution and in bringing about 
the inclusion of more Kenyans in the political process, the new African members of 
LegCo remained politically weak. They were weakened by the fact that the colonial 
administrators had banned national political activities and therefore African members 
of the LegCo had no national political or economic platforms. The new leaders and 
socio-political groups attempted to form a national alliance, but the state refused to 
recognize the alliance and their effort failed. In addition to the difficulties 
encountered from the state, divisions emerged among the leaders and their 
corresponding groups on numerous fronts, including ethnicity, leadership rivalries, 
personality, and ―infiltration by partisan white settler interests‖ (Kanyinga 1998:45). 
 
The divisions among the members of the LegCo led to their separating into 




They would subsequently evolve into the two major political parties: the Kenya 
Independence Movement (KIM) representing Kikuyu/Luo urban interests, and the 
Kenya National Party (KNP) representing smaller and less influential ethnic rural 
interests. The Kikuyu and Luo were closer to Nairobi, other urban areas as well as 
more developed areas around the settler communities. The smaller ethnic groups 
were marginalized in more remote and agricultural areas (Kanyinga 1998). This 
division between the urban and rural constituencies had a number of implications. 
The urban constituencies, by virtue of their proximity to the settler communities, 
benefited from social programs, including education and health services. Barkan 
(2011) notes that this inequality in access to services, over time, gave the Kikuyu 
ethnic group an economic advantage over the other groups. 
 
As preparations were underway for the first Lancaster House Conference in 
1960,
4
 KIM and KNP agreed to put their differences aside to present a united front 
and show Britain they were capable of governing their country. One of the first 
positive outcomes of Lancaster was the lifting of the nationwide ban on political 
activities by socio-political groups, resulting in the parties readying themselves to 
engage in national campaigns in the new environment. After the Lancaster 
Conference, the parties‘ long-established differences resurfaced. KIM organized its 
                                                 
4 The Lancaster House Conference was a set of three conferences that finally resulted in Kenya’s 
independence in 1963.  The first conference took place in 1960, which ended in a temporary 
constitution.  In the 1962 conference, the participants decided on a framework for an African-
led government.  Finally, in the 1963 London conference, formal independence was granted 
after arrangements around the issue of settler citizenship, rights, and other necessities were 





supporters for a national conference in both March and May of 1960, which led to a 
new name, the Kenya African National Union (KANU). Trying to placate other 
smaller ethnic groups, the KANU leadership elected in absentia Daniel arap Moi 
from the Kalenjin group and Ronald Ngala from the Coast for top positions in the 
party (Gertzel, Goldschmidt, and Rothchild 1969). 
 
Both Moi and Ngala rejected the offer from the KANU leadership. Moi 
created his own political party, the Kalenjin Political Alliance, to reflect his ethnic 
group interest, and Ngala formed the Coast African People‘s Union (CAPU) to 
represent his. The Bukusu-Luhya ethnic group was represented by the Kenya African 
People‘s Party (KAPP), which was formed by Muliro. Finally, Justus Ole Tipis 
formed the Maasai United Front (MUF) to represent the Maasai tribe that lived 
mostly in Southern Kenya along the Rift Valley (Gertzel et al. 1969). Unlike KANU, 
which promoted a powerful central government, these smaller parties advocated for a 
weak central government with stronger local and regional governments. The leaders 
of the smaller parties believed that strong local governments would help them 










2.5  Postcolonial Kenya     
 
The nearly seven decades of colonial rule that ended in 1963 shaped a society 
and institutions that wholly favored the rights of the small settler segment of the 
population and vastly undermined indigenous Africans‘ rights, including access to 
resources and economic activity. Patron-client relations between the colonial state 
and settlers in Kenya created agricultural and banking sectors that neglected peasant 
and smallholder farmers in favor of settler land acquisition, farming, and banking 
services. Through policies and practices of the colonial state, large numbers of 
Africans had lost their land, became no- to low-wage laborers on settler farms, or 
were marginalized in urban cities.  
 
Patron-client relations continued into independent Kenya with African 
leaders through their tribal affiliations. The new African leaders replicated much of 
the behavior that the colonial authorities passed on to them at independence in 1963, 
resulting in a legacy of intense tribal rivalry for power and control of state resources 
in the postcolonial period, what Berman (1998) called ―the politics of uncivil 
nationalism‖ (405). The colonial legacy and the rivalry among the tribal groups made 
liberalization in Kenya, to the extent it occurred during the Moi presidency, more a 





The political structure, social relations, and general conduct of the polity 
handed over to the political elite gave rise to deep ethnic divisions, which were 
manifested in intense ethnic politics and became one of the focal points of Kenya‘s 
postcolonial politics. Ethnic divisions led to the creation of parties along ethnic lines, 
which later contributed to the marginalization of certain parties, which translated into 
the marginalization of certain ethnic groups. Alemazung (2010) notes that:  
Ethnic groups who feel marginalized often develop feelings of 
revenge and hatred against those who enjoy socio-economic well-
being from the resources of their [state] because of their affiliation 
to the ruler (the ‗owner‘ or ‗controller‘ of the national cake) based 
on clientelist politicking (65-66).   
 
Kenya experienced this type of ethnic fragmentation as the different ethnic groups 
exerted pressure on the state to reform.  
 
By the time Kenya gained independence from Britain in 1963 ethnic tension 
was primed to be a major factor in national politics and political leaders sought to 
consolidate their respective tribes and parties. The Kikuyu and Luo elites, who saw 
Nairobi and urban areas as central to strengthening their political dominance, catered 
to the prevailing interests there—the financial industry and large landowners who 
engaged in agricultural trade. The efforts of the other parties centered on smallholder 
interests in rural areas, as the smaller ethnic groups were limited to these areas. It 
became an intense struggle among leaders of these ethnic-based parties for the 
control of the state and its resources and Kenya‘s first two post-colonial presidents 




2.6 Ethnic Affinities and State Resources 
 
Jomo Kenyatta, a member of Kenya‘s largest tribe, the Kikuyu, served as 
prime minister during the transition to independence and became the first 
postcolonial President. A resident in Britain for 15 years, Kenyatta was well versed 
in British politics and used his familiarity with Britain to influence public opinion 
about Kenya and against colonialism in Kenya. He was one of the leaders of the Mau 
Mau rebellion (1953-56) and one of the negotiators with Britain for Kenya‘s 
independence. He was elected President 1964 and served as president until his death 
in August 1978 (Branch and Cheeseman 2006). 
 
Kenyatta ran KANU and the state as client-patron operations. Amutabi 
(2009) notes: 
Kenyatta perfected the reward system and ‗divide and rule‘ policies 
which had been used by the colonial system. He rewarded those 
who supported him and was often accused of engaging in some 
form of ‗Kikuyunisation‘ or negative ethnicity in the process (58).  
 
Kenyatta‘s efforts to ―Africanize‖ the civil service agencies favored his ethnic group 
in filling the posts. Ministerial and cabinet posts went to Kikuyu members, including 
Commerce, Planning and Development, and Education Ministries. Kenyatta‘s critics 
and potential challengers were marginalized, or worse. In addition to being removed 
from their positions, some were detained and served long prison sentences; others 





His policies disproportionately benefited members of his ethnic group, who 
were favored with opportunities in the private sector such as joint ventures and 
appointments to directorship and management of businesses. During President 
Kenyatta‘s presidency (1963-1978), Kikuyu representation in permanent secretary 
positions was 31 percent and averaged 29 percent of cabinet posts while they 
represented 21 percent of the population.  The Kalenjin held 6 percent of permanent 
secretaries; the Kamba, Luo, and Luhya, had 13 percent, 12 percent, and 9 percent 
respectively (Kanyinga 2004). 
 
Parastatals such as the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation 
and the Kenya National Trading Corporation, two key agencies designed to provide 
credit and other technical support to Kenyan entrepreneurs, were under the control of 
Kikuyu political appointees and many of their services were extended 
disproportionately to Kikuyu entrepreneurs versus entrepreneurs from other ethnic 
groups. In addition, land issues were settled in favor of Kikuyu members. Kenyatta 
settled large numbers of Kikuyu people on ex-settlers‘ farms in the Rift Valley, 








2.7  Private Property Rights to Land 
 
The arguments for land tenure reform were similar to those made in favor of 
liberalizing any sector of the economy. The proponents argued that in order for any 
agricultural development program to be successful, it had to be based on policies that 
addressed land tenure more than on actual agrarian reform. They argued that 
individualized ownership was the key to investment, especially in rural or small-
scale farming. It was argued that individualized land tenure would make it easier for 
farmers to have access to credit and other farm-related services such as research and 
extension. Privatization and individualization of land was also considered important 
because it would restrict state intervention, which was said to distort market forces. 
Individual landowners would be left unencumbered to make rational choices about 
the use of their land (Dorner 1972). In order for a liberalized land tenure to become a 
reality, the proponents of liberalization had to dismiss customary and communal 
ownership as lacking the incentives of a privatized system to foster investment and 
innovation in agriculture. In the proponents‘ view, the customary system was lacking 
because individuals had no incentive to invest and improve the land since the returns 
on their investment would also be enjoyed by others in the community. Because of 
these shortcomings in Kenya‘s customary ownership system, an individualized and 






From 1963 to the mid-1970s, the postcolonial government continued on the 
path to land tenure reform and support to farmers in three ways. The African leaders 
were convinced that these were the best ways for agricultural development. They 
sought to support smallholder farmers and believed that in order for such support to 
be sustainable farmers should have individual rights to land ownership. The first step 
in the process was to introduce legislation moving land use from a customary or 
indigenous system to one of individualized, private property system. Second, some 
of the ex-settlers‘ agricultural lands were distributed to small farmers. The change to 
private property rights allowed smallholder farmers to register their land, receive 
title, and use the title as collateral for access to credit to whatever extent possible. 
Third, the leaders encouraged Harambee (self-help) projects (Burgess 1997).  
 
Table 2 below outlines the legal framework that moved Kenya away from a 
customary system of land rights to one of an individualized property rights system 












Table 2: Laws Affirming Individual Land Rights 
 
Customary Land Tenure Practice 
(Policy Before Change) 
Change 
Year 
Statutory Land Rights  
(After Change) 
Land belonged to whole tribe and 
grazing areas used by the community. 
This type of tenure could not induce 
individual interests to generate market 
activities. 
1963 The Registered Land Act 
Made it legal for land to be 
owned privately and registered 
in an individual‘s name. This 
type of tenure could induce 
individual interests to generate 
market activities. 
 
No system linking large farms/estates 
once owned by white settlers in the 
Highlands, Rift Valley, and other parts of 
the country. 
 
1964 Land Trust Act  
Ex-settlers lands were turned 
over to the state to be held in 
trust for the Kenyan people. 
Customary system made it difficult for 
individual to divide land. Division may 
be useful to sell in parcels, which would 
facilitate land markets. 
 
1967 Land Division Act  
Gave individuals the right to 
sub-divide their land.  
Lack of legal institutions to adjudicate 
land settlement and disputes. 
1968 Land Adjudication Act  
Created judicial systems to 




The settlement lands were returned to the government through negotiation, 
with Britain acting as the representative of the settlers. Some parts of the land were 
earmarked to be transferred to individual households and other parts were to be held 
in trust. President Kenyatta, understanding that he had to shore up his internal 
supporters, primarily drawn from his Kikuyu ethnic group, designed a system 
favorable to the Kikuyu to have access to settlement land, especially in the Rift 




instituted a series of land transfer programs. Table 3 lists the land transfer schemes 
most discussed in Kenya‘s history. 
 
Table 3: Land Transfers 
 
(a) Small Holder Settlement 
 
Scheme Area (hectares) Num. of Holdings 
Million Acre 490,707 35,401 
Harambee 6,259     431 
Haraka 57,080 15,480 
Source: (Maxon 1992:275) 
 
 








Ol Kalou 56,000 86 2,000 
Shirika 108,627 105 12,000 
Private Sale 600,000 N/A N/A 




These tables show the amount of land transferred from settlers to the 
government, which then distributed it to families. For example, the Million Acre 
Scheme consisted of 490,707 hectares of land. The government divided the land into 
35,401 holdings and then distributed them to families. Transfers in Table 3(a) 
became central to Kenya‘s smallholder agricultural production which accounts for 
the vast majority of Kenya‘s total agricultural output (60 percent of Kenya‘s tea, 





Government officials were responsible for assigning the plots to individuals 
or families on a case-by-case basis. Those who received a parcel were granted 30-
year mortgages at 5 percent interest, payable to the central government. A Central 
Land Board was established to secure the titles of the land until the new owners met 
their financial obligations. As early as 1966, approximately 20 percent of the land in 
the Highlands had been transferred to smallholder farmers through the various state-
financed and/or supported programs. In addition to these state-run programs, the 
Kenyatta government also encouraged the creation of land buying companies (Boone 
2009). 
 
The land buying companies (LBCs) were either strictly private or public-
private partnerships. They bought or leased large farms or estates from the 
government and parceled them out to individual families. According to Maxon 
(1992), more than 70 percent of large farms were in the Rift Valley. Most of the 
LBCs were owned by influential members of Kenyatta‘s ethnic group and 
government supporters who bought much of the land through state-provided 
financing. Large numbers of Kikuyus bought lands from these LBCs and settled in 
the Rift Valley. Leaders of other non-Kikuyu ethnic groups, including Vice President 
Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Luo) and Minister Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda), complained 
about lack of transparency and public corruption in these processes and those who 
traditionally occupied the Rift Valley protested Kikuyu encroachment. Unhappy with 




out of the vice presidency and Ngala died suspiciously in a roadside accident 
(Amutabi 2009; Boone 2009). 
 
This history of land tenure reform under President Kenyatta—transfer from 
settlers to the Kenyan government and from the government to individuals to hold 
privately—set in motion two issues that would come to define Kenyan politics for 
decades (and still does today). The first was distrust of the Kikuyu community by 
non-Kikuyu groups in the Rift Valley who considered the land tenure system 
established by the Kenyatta government to unjustly favor the Kikuyu. The second, 
related to trust, was the way in which President Kenyatta forced Vice President 
Odinga out of his government in 1966 over issues of corruption and macroeconomic 
development policies. Kenyatta‘s intolerance of dissent set a precedent, later 
followed by Moi as president (Amutabi 2009).  
 
 Liberalization of land ownership tenure encountered a series of domestic 
challenges. One of the main challenges had to do with tradition. Despite the new 
laws allowing individualized land ownership, the farmers‘ perception and 
understanding of the content of individualized land rights and the power they had did 
not change. This perception was strongest among smallholders. Part of the argument 
for moving away from customary land ownership to an individualized one was that 
the latter would eventually give rise to a land market as individuals were able to sell 




point that the right of the individual superseded all other rights not officially 
mentioned in the register. As part of the reforms, the Act converted all ―customary 
rights of occupation‖ into tenant rights of one year. This change gave the registered 
owner the power, after a year‘s notice, the right to terminate the occupancy of any 
tenant (Okoth-Ogendo [No Year]). 
 
The reform also countered two other problems. First, Okoth-Ogendo‘s 
research showed that smallholder farmers did not know how to value their lands. 
When asked hypothetically, how much they would ask for a plot if they had to sell it, 
most of them named such a high price that it would automatically price them out of 
the market. To these farmers ―the land was still regarded basically as a ‗family 
investment‘ and one that could not be parted with [except] in exceptional 
circumstances‖ (7), which may explain why they would ask such a high price for it. 
It may also be symbolic of the notion that the land was considered priceless.  
 
Second, the reform law faced the challenge of lineage ties. Okoth-Ogendo 
surveyed farmers in Kisii and South Nyanza who were living on lands for which they 
did not have registered titles. The research found that 95 percent of the farmers said 
they were on a particular land because it belonged to their familial lineage. They also 
noted that ―since the registered proprietors themselves had received the land more 
often by inheritance or family partition than by purchase or gift, they had no moral 




farmers expected the customary principles around land use and other practices to 
remain. For some tribes the possibility that they could be removed by registered 
landowners from the land on which they had lived for generations was startling. 
Table 4 lists responses of respondents to a hypothetical question asking what they 
would do if a registered owner of the land they were living on were to ask them to 




Table 4: Unregistered Tenants‘ Reactions to Hypothetical Survey Questions 
 
Reaction of unregistered tenants to hypothetical 
question: what would you do if a registered owner of 









Can‘t conceive of being asked to leave the land 28% 87% 
Would demand his/her share from the registered owner 55% 5% 
Would move willingly 12% 4% 
Would go to court  3% 4% 
Would buy land elsewhere 2% 0% 




In the view of these tribal members, registered landowners ―had no exclusive 
rights to the land‖ (Okoth-Ogendo [No Year]:8), they simply couldn‘t fathom being 
asked to leave, and the majority would not do so willingly. These data indicate that 
the farmers in these parts of the country did not accept the notion of private, 
individualized property rights. The low numbers of those who said they would go to 
                                                 




court also indicated lack of enthusiasm for and/or trust in or understanding of the 
legal system to address land issues.    
      
In addition to affecting farmers‘ attitudes regarding land rights, customary 
traditions also influenced how the Land Control Boards adjudicated land disputes. 
Many Land Control Boards refused to approve complete transfers of land or 
subdivisions (despite the existence of laws making these transactions legal) unless 
family members approved. There were many instances where the Land Control 
Boards required applicants to bring family members as witnesses to prove consent to 
land transactions (MacKenzie 1986). In some cases, even if family members granted 
approval, the family had to show ownership of land elsewhere to ensure ―alternative 
means of subsistence‖ (Okoth-Ogendo [No Year]:8). The requirements of having the 
approval of family members and/or proving credible proof of other means of 
subsistence negated, or at least severely minimized, the power of the legal registry. 
The legal registry was developed to help reduce the burden on landowners. Once 
they could show that the land was indeed theirs, traditional customs were not 
supposed to hinder what landowners could do with their property.  
 
These reforms were happening in an environment where many ethnic groups 
believed that they had suffered major injustices. They believed they first lost their 
land to the white settlers and then to Kikuyus in the immediate years after 




buying companies. A summary of this sentiment of deep resentment of Kikuyus was 
reported in The New York Times after the post-2007 election violence. This statement 
is relevant to Kenya any time since independence: 
In the Rift Valley, the anti-Kikuyu grudge goes back to independence, when 
the British government bought out Britons who owned huge, picturesque 
farms. But instead of redistributing that land to the impoverished people who 
had lived here for centuries, like the Kalenjin and Maasai, the newly formed 
Kenyan government, led by Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, gave much of it to 




2.8  Conclusion 
 
 
This chapter presented a historical overview showing how colonial policies 
and practices led to the marginalization of Kenyans. Internal pressures from tribal 
groups caused the colonial authorities to reform granting more freedoms and rights 
to Kenyans. The legacies of the colonial period carried over to the first postcolonial 
government. One of the primary commonalities between the colonial and the 
Kenyatta governments was that their policies favored certain groups at the expense 
of others. Another legacy of the colonial system that filtered to the postcolonial 
government was the system of private property rights to land. In both periods some 
groups were advantaged at the expense of others, contributing to deep ethnic 
divisions and internal tensions. 
 
The internal tensions and rivalry, as shown in the chapter, filtered into other 




resources, which deepened state intervention in the economy, setting the context for 
the trajectory of Kenya‘s liberalization under the Moi government after the death of 
President Jomo Kenyatta in 1978. By explicating the nature of the internal actors, 
policies and practices during the colonial and Kenyatta governments, this chapter 
shed light on and set the context for the actors that were to become key players in the 
efforts for liberalization in Kenya. In essence, one cannot fully understand the 
internal factors that forced Kenya to liberalize without a good grasp of the linkages 
between the colonial government, the Kenyatta government, and the Moi 
government. The next chapter furthers the examination of the influence of the 
policies and practices of the Kenyatta government on the Moi government and how 




























Kenya has numerous tribal groups varying greatly in their size and 
development, and among all the consciousness of separation 
remains prominent. Not only has the tribe continued to command 
the loyalty and identity of most individuals, but social and political 





 Daniel arap Moi, Kenya‘ second postcolonial president, was a pivotal figure 
on the country‘s path to political and economic liberalization. He inherited a 
government dominated by members of a rival tribe who did not trust him and did not 
want to give up any of the control and power they had. This chapter explores the Moi 
presidency, how he marginalized Kenya‘s politically active ethnic groups, primarily 
the Kikuyu and Luo, after he came to power in 1978, and how internal and external 
pressures forced him to concede to liberalization. The chapter concentrates on the 
Moi presidency (1978-2002) because that is the focus of this dissertation and it was 
also the period in which the World Bank and the IMF began a concerted effort to 
liberalize Kenya‘s economy. 
Daniel arap Moi was a member of the third largest tribal group in Kenya, the 
Kalenjin.
7
 He had been in politics since before independence, first elected to the 
Legislative Council in 1955 to represent the Rift Valley and in 1960 he was one of 
                                                 
6 Italics, mine. 




the two principal founders of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) Party. 
After independence, President Kenyatta appointed him Minister for Home Affairs 
and in 1967 he was named Kenyatta‘s Vice President. 
 
Despite serving as Vice President for over a decade, Moi was considered an 
outsider to Kenyatta‘s allies. As Kenyatta neared death, his allies sought to change 
the Constitution to bar automatic succession of the vice president to the presidency. 
To counter their campaign, Moi launched a campaign of his own, traveling the 
country promising the politics of Nyayo—to follow in the footsteps—implying that 
he would follow in the footsteps of Kenyatta. Moi‘s campaign was successful, the 
―Change the Constitution‖ movement failed, and he became president after the death 
of Kenyatta in 1978 (Throup 1993). 
 
Once in power, however, President Moi sought to break the Kikuyu and Luo 
political dominance by uniting the other Kalenjin-affiliated ethnic groups—the 
Nandis, Marakwets, Keiyos, and Pokots—as a way to counter the Kikuyu and Luo. 
Part of his effort involved breaking the Kikuyu Central Association (S. Ambrose, 
personal correspondence, January 15, 2012). Throup (1987) described the Kikuyu 
Central Association as involving a group of ―proto-capitalists‖ which, during the 
Kenyatta reign, ―legitimized the accumulation of land and capital […] within the 
framework of a revitalized traditional mythology‖ (6). President Moi‘s strategy of 




Meru Association (GEMA), a group that was considered to be the strongest 




3.1  Ethnic Rivalry 
 
Moi came to power in a climate of deep-seated ethnic rivalry, a rivalry that 
began in the 1950s as preparations were being made for Kenya to be transferred from 
the colonial government to the Kenyan nationalists. Ethnic-affiliated community 
associations that were created prior to independence were transformed into political 
parties but retained their ethnic affinities. Rivalry over land, public employment, and 
overall control of the state festered among the three political and/or economically 
relevant groups: Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo. Many of Kenya‘s tribes viewed the 
Kikuyu as being the most advantaged and resented it. Barkan (2011) explains this 
resentment of the Kikuyu as a direct legacy of the colonial government which 
established ―a system of racial segregation‖ and built an economy around the white 
settler communities. ―The British then concentrated infrastructural and economic 
development in the settler areas and in Nairobi to support the settler economy,‖ 
including social services and education (4).  
Kikuyu benefited the most from these services by virtue of residing in the 




group, a position they have never relinquished and that has been protected and 
encouraged by Kikuyu leaders throughout the post-independence period‖ (Barkan 
2011:5). They enjoyed a disproportionate share of the country‘s middle class wealth 
and privileges and other ethnic groups tried to limit their political and economic 
power and influence.  
 
The Kenyatta administration had major implications for the political and 
economic structures that came about under the subsequent Moi administration, 
including the emergence and nature of political dissent. Holmquist, Weaver, and 
Ford (1994) have called it the ―politics of dissent under the label of democracy‖ (71). 
Similar to Kenyatta before him, Moi pursued ―clientelist politics informed by a 
strong ideology of ethnic competition‖ (Holmquist, Weaver, and Ford 1994:80), 
which led to a de jure one-party system in 1982. Corruption, economic decline, 
political repression, and a general sense of malaise and fatigue with the authoritarian 
President Moi empowered domestic actors from various sectors of society to 
organize, develop and extend protest- and self-help organizations to demand political 
and economic reform during the period from 1982 to 2002.  
 
Ethnic rivalry filtered through the political discourse in Kenya especially 
when people thought they were in ―safe‖ company, or in ―polite political discourse.‖ 
Individuals from one ethnic groups would precede an insult of a rival from another 




Maasai, both pastoralist livestock-rearing tribes; a ―certain community‖ or anything 
associated with Mount Kenya to refer to the Kikuyu, who concentrate in that area; 
and ―the people of the lake‖ or ―those from the west‖ to refer to the Luo who live 
along the basin of Lake Victoria (Email correspondence, Ambrose 2012; Wong 
2009).    
 
Favoring of Kikuyu changed when Moi became president. During the Moi 
presidency (1978-2002), the percentage of permanent secretaries filled by Kalenjin 
increased from six percent to between 22 and 30 percent. The share of positions held 
by the Kikuyu dropped to 20 percent from around 30 percent and declined further to 
10 percent between 1994 and 2001. These distribution patterns were also reflected in 
the civil service sector (Kanyinga 2004). These changes reflected how the state and 
state resources were used to support the ethnic groups of the presidents.  
 
Interviews for this research in Kenya in July 2010 revealed continued 
resentment among former civil servants (Kikuyu) for losing their positions under the 
Moi government. They recounted how positions in the civil service sector were 
based on tribal affiliation. One Kikuyu woman recounted how she was laid off or 
―forced to retire‖ in the 1980s ―by Moi‖ and was ―replaced by one of Moi‘s people,‖ 
illustrating what scholars have broadly explained in the literature about Kenya and 
ethnic politics (Holmquist, Weaver, and Ford 1994; Jonyo 2002; Klopp 2001). This 




and the extent to which it took place in Kenya. The rivalry and competition to catch 
up with the Kikuyu politically and economically in a country with limited 
opportunities was central to other groups‘ efforts to gain control of the state—since 





The deeply rooted tribal tradition of Harambee gained official recognition 
and institutional prominence in 1963 when President Kenyatta used it to praise the 
importance of collective voluntary initiatives in development projects. Communities 
organized themselves and their resources in Harambee to build local schools and 
health clinics, to dig wells and cattle dips. In 1976, a government study found that 
Harambee contributions accounted for 40 percent of capital development in rural 
areas, and in 1986, it was estimated that Harambee provided between four and ten 
percent of the government‘s annual development expenditure (Kenya 1988:29). Over 
time, Harambee initiatives became heavily political; as they grew, their projects 
became more important to development. Even though Harambee projects 
traditionally received government support, member contributions in the form of cash 
and labor, especially in the first decade after independence, were their principal 





Harambee became closely associated with President Kenyatta, especially the 
community-based, collective or development- from- below approach. He perceived 
this type of community organizing to help each other as indicative of Kenyan 
culture. As the leadership of KANU began to shift from Kikuyu to Kalenjin when 
Moi came to power in 1978, tension in Harambee began to emerge. Ngau (1987) 
argued that the tensions were the result of changes in how the political elites and 
professional class would have to relate to Harambee to build political constituencies 
as they sought public office and access to the state. These intense tensions emanated 
―from the realities of Kenya‘s class structure, especially the role of the elite in self-
help leadership, and from bureaucratic and professional behavior patterns of the 
Kenyan government‖ (Ngau 1987:528). 
 
The political significance of Harambee was that after independence it 
became one of the primary means by which politicians could establish constituencies 
by supporting and even initiating community projects, and through their influence in 
the government and/or private sector raise funds for them. As a result, communities 
that needed projects had them undertaken; local civil servants advanced their careers 
as development agents, and some local elites used Harambee funds for their personal 
use. The Moi government increased its scrutiny and regulations of Harambee in 
1979 through the Ministry of Social Services, local and regional community 
development committees (CDCs), and by demanding a number of requirements 




Related to that major shift between the Kenyatta and Moi periods with 
respect to the operation of Harambee was the shift in type of contribution, as 
President Moi sought to undermine the Harambee movement to restructure it to fit 
his politics of Nyayo. As Moi consolidated his power, the concept of Nyayo came to 
be understood by the political elite as politics from the top down or the politics of 
following orders from the top as opposed to Harambee, with its bottom-up approach. 
As a result, the form or type of member support (labor and cash) changed.  
 
During the Kenyatta presidency, people supported Harambee primarily by 
contributing their labor to community-based projects. Contributing one‘s labor to 
Harambee was an indication that people approved of the projects, wanted to be 
associated with them, and wanted to see them completed. During the Moi 
presidency, on the other hand, contributions were predominantly cash, which could 
be more easily reallocated and used for different projects and purposes. The 
increased proportion of cash in the movement, from 42 percent in 1965 to 68 percent 
in 1984, created an environment more conducive to corruption. This change in 
Harambee and other changes requiring government approval of certain projects were 
viewed as a shift in how the Moi government planned to relate to wananchi (the 
citizenry)—micro managing and more heavy-handed than Kenyatta. People began to 
disassociate themselves from the movement as it was becoming closely linked with 
the Moi government. Corruption by the political and economic elite was on the rise 




Government intrusions into and restrictions on the Harambee movement, 
embezzlement, and corruption led to frustration and resentment. Communities 
became disillusioned and demanded reform of Harambee as a conduit to demanding 
reform of the Moi government, especially corruption. To assuage these demands, 
President Moi issued a code of ethics for leaders engaging in Harambee projects. As 
Harambee was associated with President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, the Kikuyu 
community viewed President Moi‘s restrictions and intrusions as a threat to them and 
their Harambee. This call for Harambee reform became part of the call for broad 
reform of government institutions and policies. Their demands were framed as being 




3.3  Economic Decline 
 
As Gourevitch (1986) notes, the ―fat years and the lean ones are, of course, 
interconnected.‖ They both force change, but ―it is the crisis years that put systems 
under stress‖ (9). This basic observation of the ability of crisis to test systems, in 
Kenya‘s case, economic crisis, is very appropriate to the Moi government in the 
1980s as it struggled to navigate the pressures to liberalize, including pressures from 
a rapidly deteriorating economy caused by falling world commodity prices and steep 




his Kikuyu rivals, President Moi anticipated eventual economic reform, but whatever 
the nature of the reforms, he did not want to be left weakened and unable to control 
public resources for political advantage.  
 
However, the pressure caused by economic decline, ethnic rivalry, public 
corruption and repression limited Moi‘s ability to resist and delay liberalizing reform 
in the 1990s. As scholars such as Holmquist et al. (1994) have noted: 
 
The economy slowed down in the 1970s, hampering the regime‘s 
ability to use patronage to stem opposition. This became a greater 
problem as the 1980s wore on. […]. By 1982, the economy was in 




As a result, the government was not able ―to maintain a large state sector and juggle 
political tensions generated by the economic sectors and ethnic calculations in a 
strategy of rule‖ (ibid.).  
 
The first ten years of Kenya‘s independence are sometimes referred to as the 
―Golden Years‖ because of the country‘s impressive record of economic growth and 
social progress. During that decade, the country saw respectable economic growth, 
as GDP averaged 6.6 percent per year and per capita income grew at an average rate 
of 2.6 percent annually. The decade of 1980-1990, on the other hand, is sometimes 




increased social and political unrest leading to political and civic groups agitating for 
reform. The period of economic decline started in the mid-1970s following the first 
oil shock of 1973 and grew progressively worse in the 1980s. Between 1980 and 
1989, the average rate of per capita income growth was only 0.4 percent, and 
between 1990 and 1995, the rate fell to -0.3 percent (Kenya 1997). 
 
The Kenyan government reported that from 1980 to 1996 there had been 
virtually no improvement in the living standards of the population and the welfare of 
the majority of people, in fact, had declined as measured by the increase in the 
number of Kenyans living below the absolute poverty line. Moreover, the number of 
the unemployed and underemployed rose during the same period, 1980 to 1996. 
Employment opportunities were not being created fast enough to keep up with an 
expanding labor force. More than 300,000 youth were joining the labor market every 
year but only 7 percent of them would find employment. Throughout the 1980s 
Kenya‘s capital stock fell to 2.7 percent annually, compared to a yearly average of 
7.1 percent in the 1970s (Kenya 1997). Youth employment later became one of the 
major reasons behind students‘ protests and demands on the Moi government for 
reform. 
 
In addition to the oil shocks of the 1970s, the decline of Kenya‘s terms of 
trade, domestic inflation in the early 1980s, and general policy mismanagement also 




complained were grossly mismanaged was the civil service sector. The government 
increased the public sector by creating extra positions in major ministries. While the 
government of Kenya always used the public sector as a way to issue largesse to 
political supporters, the scale of expansion rose significantly in the 1980s. Between 
1974 and 1984, excluding teachers, total wage employment in the national 
government increased by 7.4 percent annually compared to 2.8 percent in the private 
sector. As a result, public employees‘ salaries as a share of recurrent government 
expenditure increased from 47 percent in 1979/1980 to 60 percent in 1984/1985. 
Salaries in the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development rose the most, 
from 60 to 90 percent. Rising oil prices also took an enormous toll:  by the end of 
1980, Kenya was spending 50 percent of its foreign exchange earnings on oil while 
at the same time prices of commodities such as coffee and tea were in decline 
(Kenya 1988:32). 
 
Another economic driver of reform had to do with the state‘s budgetary 
difficulties, one of the most significant of which was high levels of loss generated by 
state-owned enterprises. Kenya invested an estimated USD $1.4 billion in its 
parastatals between 1963 and 1984. This assessment was confirmed in 1986 in a 
study of 16 major Kenyan agricultural and agro-industrial parastatals. The study 
showed aggregate losses for the years 1977 to 1984 totaling USD $183 million at 
1986 exchange rates. An analysis of that investment showed that even with all of the 




the rate of return on the estimated investment was 0.4 percent, which implies that a 
fair number of the enterprises have consistently been loss makers‖ (Nellis and Kikeri 
1989:661). Many of these enterprises were grain marketing boards, a large portion of 
whose losses could be attributed to government pricing and purchasing policies. As 
these losses mounted, liberalization was viewed as necessary ―to broaden the role of 
market signals and align relative prices more closely with those in world markets.‖ 
Among the key sectors that the government listed to liberalize were agriculture, 
industry and trade, and the financial sector. The Kenyan government called the need 
to reform, ―a departure from previous practice‖ (Kenya 1997:4; Kenya 2002; Nellis 
and Kikeri 1989). 
 
 These economic challenges created enormous political and social pressures 
on the government and, in order for the government to be viewed as credible, new 
policies were necessary. The internal pressures for reform convinced the Moi 
government to seek outside assistance, as the country was in need of resources to 
implement any reform. It was then (1980) that Kenya accepted its first concessional 









3.4  The Power of Popular Pressure 
 
As previously noted, when President Moi came to office, he quickly sought 
to consolidate his power. During the first three years of his government, many 
prominent Kikuyu were forced out of KANU. In 1982, following a failed coup d‘état 
against him, Moi made his most overt policy statement by amending Kenya‘s 
Constitution to outlaw opposition political parties. The constitutional change made 
KANU the only legal political party in Kenya. Moi argued that the multi-party 
system encouraged ethnic discord, which was the same argument that President 
Kenyatta made in 1966 when he recruited leaders of other parties to join KANU. 
Leaders of the other political parties protested Moi‘s constitutional change and were 
joined by civic and religious organizations condemning the one-party system. They 
accused President Moi of legalizing and legitimizing repression through one-party 
rule. Political opposition and civic leaders saw banning other political parties as 
closing the national political space. The government‘s action helped strengthen and 
expand the base of opposition to President Moi‘s policies and practices (Murungi 
2000; S. Ambrose, personal communication, February 5, 2012) 
 
The year 1982 marked the beginning of the period in which people opposed 
to the one-party system of government became increasingly public and vocal in their 
opposition. As political and civic leaders continued to condemn President Moi‘s 




from politics or making it difficult for groups with which they were affiliated to 
operate, even disbanding some of them. President Moi used his executive power to 
disband the Kenya Union of Civil Servants, the Kikuyu-based Gikuyu Embu Meru 
Association and the University Academic Staff Union (UASU). When the 
government was criticized by the academic establishment, President Moi ordered a 
crackdown on university professors. Many UASU officials were detained without 
charges or indicted on charges under sections of the Preservation of Public Security 
Act (Murungi 2000). 
Political leaders who voiced opposition to President Moi‘s constitutional 
change were also detained. Among them, Raila Odinga, Kenya‘s current Prime 
Minister and son of Jaramogi Odinga who was Kenyatta‘s first Vice-president, was 
charged with treason. Other prominent anti-single party rule activists were detained 
without charges though many of them were later released. Others were tried and 
received long prison sentences. In addition to political leaders and activists, the 
religious community emerged in opposition to one-party rule as well. A key figure in 
this effort was Reverend Timothy Njoya from St. Andrews Church in Nairobi. In one 
of his sermons, Reverend Njoya called on President Moi ―to abolish detention 
without trial during peace time and to invite dissidents, detainees, and exiles…for 
dialogue‖ (Murungi 2000:17). 
 
Rev. Njoya was, in effect, one of the first in Kenya to oppose one-party rule, 




Another in the religious community recruited to support reform was Bedan Mbugua, 
the former editor of the National Council of Churches of Kenya's (NCCK) magazine 
Beyond, who would later become very important in the official political opposition 
party, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) (Kanyinga, Kiondo, 
Tidemand, and Gibbon 1994). 
 
By 1990, student and opposition protests that first started in Nairobi and 
surrounding areas, which were predominantly Kikuyu and Luo, spread to other 
locations throughout the country. In addition to economic hardships, protestors‘ 
concerns ranged from conditions at public universities to political assassinations. 
When demonstrations were characterized as political, the government resorted to 
coercive force to suppress them. Popular protests against the Moi government 
intensified when mourners at Foreign Mister Robert Ouko‘s funeral were fired on by 
paramilitary forces, allegedly at President Moi‘s order. Minister Ouko was allegedly 
killed by government security forces close to President Moi because he was close to 
completing an inquiry into public corruption in which close associates of the 
president were said to be involved in graft and theft of public resources (Bratton and 
Walle 1992). 
 
These protests culminated in what was known as saba saba (seven seven), 
referring to July 7, 1990, the day a protest in favor of multi-parties in Kenya was 




the leaders of the movement, including Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia, and Paul 
Muite were arrested and detained and thirty people were killed. The opposition 
became extremely intense as more people began to express more public opposition to 
the Moi government (Gekara 2010; Ochieng 2010). 
 
 
3.5  External Pressure as a Complement to Internal Pressure 
 
 
International financial institutions (IFIs) have played a role in Kenya‘s 
economy since the early 1960s. The World Bank gave Kenya its first financial 
support in 1960 during the transition from colonialism to independence. Its first 
agricultural sector loan of $8.4 million was issued in 1961 and between 1961 and 
1997, the Bank provided 41 loans or credit to the Kenyan government to develop and 
liberalize the agricultural sector. The IMF provided its first postcolonial financial 
assistance to Kenya in 1973. From 1975 to 2000 the IMF‘s Board of Directors 
approved 12 additional loans for Kenya. Appendix C presents a list of World Bank 
loans to Kenya for the agricultural sector since 1960 and Appendix D lists IMF‘s 
loans (Bank 1998; Mussa and Savastano 1999; O'Brien and Ryan 2001). 
 
The purpose of World Bank and IMF assistance was liberalization to generate 
economic growth and to facilitate political stability. They were only marginally 




an evaluation of its various assistance programs in Kenya from 1961 to 1997 and 
assessed many of its programs there as unsatisfactory. While its 1986 agricultural 
capacity-building program was assessed marginally satisfactory, 30 of 41 programs 
were evaluated in 1998 and 50 percent of them were assessed unsatisfactory. The 
World Bank argued that the poor performance of its projects in the 1970s and 80s 
was due primarily to the poor macroeconomic and domestic agricultural policy 
environment that existed under the Kenyatta and Moi governments.  Both the IMF 
and World Bank used their funding as leverage to press for economic reform. When 
Kenya signed on to the IMF/World Bank‘s structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in 
1980, one of the conditions was to reform Kenya‘s National Cereals and Produce 
Board (NCPB). Despite receiving a number of loans, however, the NCPB went 
without significant reform until 1992 when private investors were first allowed to 
enter the grain market (Bank 1998). 
 
Earlier loans had been extended to Kenya as a response to the first oil price 
shock of October 1973. The government received a concession loan in 1979/80 to 
help stabilize its economy and to allow it space to begin its reform process. This loan 
was followed by two agricultural sector loans in 1982 and 1986 both of which were 
conditioned on Kenya reforming the sector. After the second world oil price shock in 
1979, the IFIs shifted their focus from agricultural project lending to policy reform in 
Kenya. The IFIs expressly ―aimed to liberalize agricultural pricing and to improve 





project planning and management capacity, including some land policy reform‖ 
(Bank 1998:21). 
 
Donor funds to Kenya averaged 9 percent of GDP between 1970 and 1999, 
which accounted for about 20 percent of the annual government budget and financed 
over 80 percent of the country‘s development expenditures. Aid flow increased 
significantly over time, from an annual average of US$205 million in the 1970s to 
slightly over US$1 billion in the 1990s. The aid inflows exceeded the total receipts 
from all other foreign exchange earners and at the same time Kenya was ranked the 
eighth-largest aid recipient in the world (Mussa and Savastano 1999; Njehu 2003).  
 
As financial aid to Kenya increased, the conditionality terms of these loans 
became increasingly stringent. The tightening of the terms, however, only came 
about after President Moi came under intense domestic pressure to reform. From 
early 1989 through the summer of 1990, internal pressure and demands on Moi to 
allow multiparty politics and elections had increased. The government responded to 
the internal pressures by cracking down on pro-multiparty activists on July 7, 1990, 
resulting in more than twenty deaths (Murungi 2000). The first IFI attempt, in line 
with domestic actors‘ demands, to intensify pressure on the government came in 
November 1991 in Paris at the multi-donor Kenyan Consultative Group meeting. At 




least six months until the government made ―improvements in terms of economic 
and political reforms‖ (Mailafia 1997:31).  
 
The Consultative Group meeting also declined to commit any new financial 
support until ―substantial‖ progress on the political and economic reform agenda had 
taken place. The lack of financial support affected the Kenyan government‘s 
budgetary position immensely and led to an increased budget deficit. The 
government resorted to domestic borrowing from the banking sector. Government 
borrowing from domestic banks increased by 59 percent during the 1990-91 fiscal 
year (GOK 1992, Budget Speech).  
 
In the midst of all the political and economic pressure on Kenya for reform, 
the IFIs added another conditionality: combating corruption. Addressing corruption 
became a major focus of the IMF and the World Bank‘s engagement with Kenya 
beginning in the 1990s, as corruption became a prominent concern, especially with 
the revelation of the Goldenberg scandal.  
 
The Goldenberg scandal, which is estimated to have cost Kenya $850 
million, a fifth of the country‘s GDP, involved government officials, members of 
President Moi‘s family, and billionaire Kamlesh Pattni. In 1990, in an effort to 
revive the failing economy after the first Gulf War by encouraging exporters to 




interest rate on foreign currency deposited in Kenya‘s Central Bank. Presenting his 
company, Goldenberg International, as a diamonds and gold export-processing 
agency, and with the complicity of some officials at CBK, several commercial banks, 
and the Ministry of Finance, Pattni manipulated the system and received a 35 percent 
fee on payment made by the treasury for the export of minerals from 1990 to 1993. It 
was discovered that the shipments never happened (Karanja 2003). 
 
Once the scandal was made public, the IMF and other donors demanded an 
investigation and implementation of anti-corruption programs in order for Kenya to 
receive any financial assistance. The IMF notes that the ―case was noteworthy for its 
size, the range of the channels used, its coincidence with the 1992 elections, and the 
lack of conclusive legal follow-up‖ (IMF 2011). In 2000, the IMF and other 
multilateral donors suspended the disbursement of $200 million in loans to Kenya 
after the government backtracked on its commitment to fight corruption. One 
interpretation of the government‘s failure to follow up with any serious investigation 
was that it was not too concerned about the suspension of financial aid. That is, the 
lack of investigation was an indication that financial aid was not a primary factor in 
the government‘s approach to dealing with public corruption (Karanja 2003). 
 
The IFIs‘ threat to withhold financial assistance to Kenya was nonetheless an 
important signal to Kenya regarding its failure to combat corruption, and such a 





corruption and other government abuses dating back to 1982 after the constitutional 
change to one-party rule. In defiance of the law against opposition political parties, 
the reformists created the National Democratic Party (NDP), ―declaring that 
multiparty democracy offered the only hope for an end to corruption, economic 
mismanagement, and unaccountable government‖ (Barkan 1993:91). Civic 
organizations including churches and professional associations also were demanding 
reforms that included political transparency, political pluralism, and an end to public 
corruption.  
 
The first major political success of the internal actors‘ efforts toward 
liberalization of the political system was the repeal in 1991 of the section of the 
Constitution that had made KANU the only legal political party and provided for the 
formation of other political parties. This change was one of the most important 
features of political reform in Kenya since independence and paved the way for the 
first multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections under the new system in 
December 1992 (Kanyinga 2007). The second political victory was acknowledgment 
that public-sector corruption needed to be arrested. Opposition politicians and civic 
organizations, supported by the then highly constrained media, spent years criticizing 
the record of the Moi government on economic regulation, calling for purposeful 
reforms. By the late 1990s, Kenya‘s Parliament had passed a number of laws to 




a $22 million loan package in 1996 if Kenya did not address corruption, domestic 
groups had already forced the issue onto the national agenda (Jarso 2010; Ponce 
1998). 
 
The efforts of the domestic actors, with the support of pressure from external 
actors, were very successful. Their major success was political pluralism. In Kenya‘s 
first contested, multi-party election in 1992, President Moi was reelected but only 
with a plurality of the vote. He won the presidential election because the opposition 
was split along tribal lines and unable to unite behind one candidate. Amutabi (2009) 
noted that ―many observers of Kenya‘s political scene believe that it was the Kikuyu 
factor that destroyed the opposition unity in 1992 allowing KANU to win the 
election‖ (64-5).  
 
Two years after the first multiparty election, a new alliance, the United 
National Democratic Alliance, was formed. As the next multiparty elections 
approached in 1997, the new alliance once again splintered along ethnic lines. This 
split—which first happened with the political parties in the mid-1950s and 
reoccurred in 1992 1997—highlighted the central role of ethnicity in Kenyan 
politics. Moi won reelection again in 1997 because of the ethnic division and his 
ability to successfully co-opt the opposition‘s message. When the opposition parties 
threatened to boycott the elections unless their demands for reforms were met, 




work on additional reform initiatives. Furthermore, he managed to defuse some of 
their complaints in the summer of 1997 by agreeing to work on their demands. Moi 
managed to stay in power for ten years after the first multiparty elections in 1992 
(Amutabi 2009; Wanyande 2007).  
 
 
3.6  Conclusion 
 
Moi implemented policies that favored his Kalenjin ethnic community at the 
expense of other ethnic communities. He behaved in ways similar to President 
Kenyatta, including repression of political opponents. The policies and behavior 
created resentment among the Kikuyu and Luo communities, but members of the 
Kalenjin community and Moi justified the policies as redressing historical wrongs 
done to them and other smaller ethnic groups during the Kenyatta presidency. For 
the Kikuyu and Luo communities, replacing Moi became an imperative. When the 
coup attempt against Moi in 1982 failed, they saw reform as their best strategy to 
politically weaken him and eventually defeat him and his political party.  
 
The ethnic rivalry, corruption in Harambee, and economic decline aligned 
perfectly to create an environment where popular pressure served as the most 
effective tool to force the government to concede to liberalization. Internal agitation 




protests, causing international actors to come to the aid of the reformers and support 
their demands on the state. Pressure from the World Bank and IMF complemented 
the internal pressures and strengthened the internal actors, which further constrained 
Moi‘s space to maneuver. This dynamics between internal and external actors in 
pushing the state toward liberalization played out in individual sectors of Kenya‘s 
economy. The next two chapters present the agricultural and financial sectors, 
respectively, and illustrate how the different actors – internal and external – 











PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION:  
AGRICUTLURAL SECTOR REFORM IN KENYA 
 
 
Scholars who have written about the spread of liberalization to the 
developing world over the last 40 years have credited the World Bank and IMF as 
the primary external actors driving this phenomenon. The consensus has been that 
these external actors have been able to force developing countries to embrace 
liberalization through conditionality. However, when examining the policy 
recommendations and evaluation reports of the World Bank and IMF‘s programs, it 
is obvious that oftentimes there were no metrics to measure progress; the institutions 
had no way of identifying duplicate projects in countries‘ requests for assistance; 
countries did not often adhere to the conditionality terms or implement the policy 
recommendations; and countries also continued to receive financial aid when the 
World Bank and IMF publicly said they would not provide assistance.  
 
In the case of Kenya, the World Bank reported that it provided financial 
assistance to Kenya to carry out some of the same agricultural reforms five times. 
Easterly best made this argument and it is worth quoting at length: 
 
There was no progress on economic reform indicators from one 
adjustment loan to the next in the same country (Easterly, 2002; Van 




conditions are violated is that with high political instability, a new 
government took power and was given a clean slate by the aid 
agencies. But there are a number of cases where aid was given 
repeatedly even to the same government in the same country. For 
example, World Bank reports on Kenya repeated a recommendation 
for increased funding for road maintenance in 1979, 1983, 1989, 
1994, 1996, and 2000. A World Bank (1998) report noted that in 
Kenya ―the World Bank provided aid to support identical agricultural 
policy reforms five separate times.‖ Yet the IMF and World Bank 
gave Kenya 21 adjustment loans during 1980-2000, all under the 
same regime of President Daniel [a]rap Moi. President Moi of Kenya 
got one conditional aid loan each from the World Bank and IMF in 
the year 2000, despite his poor track record and the new emphasis on 





The lack of rigorous assessment of proposals, lack of metrics to evaluate 
progress, and the lack of uniformity around reporting should temper the arguments 
that conditionality terms from these institutions were the main force pushing the Moi 
government toward liberalization. This chapter offers a different explanation, 
focusing on internal actors instead of these external institutions for Kenya‘s 
liberalizing reforms in the agricultural sector, a sector that generates nearly 20 
percent of Kenya‘s gross domestic product, and on which more than 80 percent of 
the population relies for its livelihood. 
 
This chapter begins by explicating the various ways in which the state could 
undertake privatization, a major pillar of liberalization. Liberalization in this sector 
involved privatization of state-owned agricultural parastatals, marketing boards and 
cooperatives and/or removing their monopoly powers so that private investors could 
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enter the market. This section is followed by a discussion of the importance of the 
agricultural sector in Kenya and how internal and external actors pressured the state 
to concede to reform. The chapter then focuses on the liberalization of Kenya Co-
operative Creameries and the dairy market and highlights similar reforms in other 
agricultural market boards. The last section describes how pressure from a coalition 
of small-scale farmers and business groups and deteriorating economic conditions 
contributed to reforming public subsidy programs to farmers.  
 
 
4.1 Forms of Privatization 
 
 
Strictly defined, ―privatization is the transfer of public sector assets and 
activities to the private sector‖ (Nyong'o 2000:2). Here, privatization refers to 
―policies aimed at transferring full or partial ownership and control of public 
enterprises to the private sector to encourage competition and emphasize the role of 
market forces in place of statutory restrictions and monopoly power‖ (Ngugi 
2000:83). There are three broad forms of privatization: full or partial ownership, 
management, and decontrol or de-monopolization. The sale or transfer of state-
owned companies could be affected through competitive bidding, divestiture, 






Full or partial ownership means that the government may sell a state-owned 
company to private investors outright or sell shares of the company through a 
process of competitive bidding. The bid is open to a number of potential investors 
who then compete to buy the shares. This method provides the state with the best 
opportunity to get the best deal. Competitive bidding can be the best way to assuage 
concerns over corruption and nepotism (Ngugi 2000). 
 
The Moi government did not use this method because, it was assumed, few if 
any in the Kalenjin community had the financial resources or technical know-how 
necessary to make such investments. The best a Kalenjin could do in terms of large-
scale investment was to partner with the existing international corporations in Kenya 
or domestic firms at the time. Such partnerships in Kenya were never secure, 
however, because such partnerships changed when the political environment in the 
country changed, along ethnic lines (Himbara 1994).  
 
The government may also privatize a public company through divestiture by 
floating shares of the company through a formal capital market where individual 
investors can buy them. Among the advantages of this method is that it allows broad 
ownership, meaning more people in the public have the potential to purchase shares 
in the company provided the share price is affordable. The country, however, has to 
have a capital market, which Kenya had, and the company has to be considered 




form of private sector commitment‖ (95). This method has many challenges, 
particularly its susceptibility to political pressure from lawmakers, current 
employees, and interest groups. It also requires high level of expertise in valuation, 
pricing, and all the ―formalities in preparation of prospectus‖ and other application 
forms (ibid.).  
 
The Moi government first used it in 1988 and 1990 for partial divestiture 
from the Commercial Bank of Kenya. The timing of these two rounds of 
privatization corresponded with the intense domestic pressure on the government to 
reform, a move that happened three years before the Kenyan government sought 
assistance from the IFIs for its parastatal Reform Program. The government reduced 
its ownership of Kenya Commercial Bank by 40 percent at the time of these 
transactions (Bank 2001). 
 
 The government was responding to public pressure regarding corruption. By 
spending resources and time to ensure that the valuation and pricing of parastatal 
privatization was done correctly, President Moi sought to calm popular calls for 
transparency, and hoped to reduce the political pressure on his government. 
Makonnen (2001) explains this same point:  
In fact, considerable time and resources were devoted to valuations; and 
price was the single most important determinant in selecting investors 
in most cases. Selecting a bidder who offers the highest price renders it 
easier to convince observers that the process is transparent and thus 





The management buyout method involves selling the company to existing 
employees who are able to secure financing through banks. Employees and managers 
become owners. A disadvantage of this method is that it is often used when the 
company is not able to go public through capital markets for a number of reasons, 
including uncertainty regarding its value. While the public may be uncertain about 
the value of the company, management may have an idea of how new infusion of 
capital can give it leverage. A disadvantage of this method is that it increases the 
likelihood that the company will be undervalued. The government may also decide to 
maintain the company but privatize management through a management contract. 
The issue of valuation remains but this method indicates that the government‘s 
commitment to private sector participation is weak (Ngugi 2000).   
 
Decontrol permits private businesses to enter the market to compete with or 
complement state-owned businesses. Ngugi (2000) argues that in this case, ―if a 
competitive strategy is adopted, then market pressure may help improve the 
performance and commercial outlook of the public enterprise […]‖ (94). The 
Kenyan government used the decontrol method to a considerable extent especially in 
the agricultural sector as it did away with monopoly powers from several of the 







4.2 Importance of the Agricultural Sector and Pressure to Reform 
 
Eighty percent of Kenya‘s land is arid or semi-arid where many of Kenya‘s 
pastoral and nomadic tribes live and/or rotate throughout different seasons. They 
account for 20 percent of the population and own half of Kenya‘s livestock. The 
importance of agriculture makes arable land a high-value asset, and a sensitive issue 
among the various tribal groups (Alila and Atieno 2006). Arable land is defined 
based on the amount of rainfall received per year. The land is ranked as high, 
medium, or low potential. An area is classified as high potential agricultural land if it 
gets at least 857 mm of rain per year. The land is classified as medium potential if it 
gets between 735 and 857.5 mm of year per year; and low potential receives 612.5 
mm or less of rainfall per year (Obara 2000). 
 
Of Kenya‘s 44.6 million hectare area, only 8.6 million hectares are ranked as 
medium- to high-potential agricultural land. Of those 8.6 million hectares, 60% 
percent (5.2 million hectares) is allocated to crop and milk production. Milk 
production alone accounts for 47 percent of the 5.2 million hectares used for farming 
and maize, wheat, tea and coffee production for over 25 percent of this farmland 
(Kenya 1988). Given the importance of the dairy and cereal industries, these sub-



















Central 909 15 41 353 1,318 3,882 
Coast 373 796 5,663 1,472 8,304 2,623 
Eastern 503 2,189 11,453 1,431 15,576 4,841 
Nairobi 16 - 38 14 68 2,290 
N. Eastern - - 12,690 - 12,690 1,055 
Nyanza 1,218 34 - - 1,252 4,598 
Rift Valley 3,025 123 12,230 1,515 16,883 7,386 
Western 741 - - 82 823 3,532 
 6,785 3,157 42,115 4,867 56,914 30,207 
Source: (Nyangito, Nzuma, Ommeh, and Mbithi 2004:14) 
 
The regions with the largest portion of land in the high potential area are the 
Rift Valley (3,025 ha), Nyanza (1,218 ha) and the Central (909 ha) and Western (741 
ha) Provinces. About 3.2 million hectares of the land were subdivided into smaller 
holdings averaging 1.2 hectares per individual. Larger holdings of about 780 million 
hectares were subdivided into individual ownership of 3,600 owners. Kenya‘s 
postcolonial agricultural policy was based on these factors of land divisions, 
availability of graded agricultural land, and the land tenure systems – customary and 





The pastoralist and nomadic tribes who lived in the arid and semi arid regions 
were marginalized by the Kenyatta government because they were associated 
KADU, the opposition party after independence. When Moi came to power he 
initiated a program to benefit them. President Moi had to develop programs quickly 
because his KADU constituencies saw his rise to the presidency as their turn to 
benefit from state largesse, as it was the case for Kikuyu under President Kenyatta. 
The program focused on ways to improve breeding of sheep and goats, and on 
developing and improving stock routes and water supplies. The World Bank 
supported the initial program with a $4 million loan. These ethnic groups, who had 
been marginalized, began to see tangible benefits from the state (Bank 1981).  
 
The World Bank noted the shift in policy and program focus in 1981, 
referring to what the Moi government proposed to do in its first development plan 
(1979-1983), ―in addition to projects to increase larger scale commercial and 
smallholder production, a series of integrated rural development projects in semi-arid 
areas is proposed to redress the neglect of these areas‖ (Bank 1979; Bank 1981:5). 
Just as in any political system, constituents approve of their politicians who bring 
development projects to their communities. The new program helped broaden 
President Moi‘s coalition, secure his power, and set the tone (of adherence to ethnic 








4.3 IFI Support and Reform 
 
 
Both the World Bank and IMF provided financial assistance to Kenya under 
President Moi to reform the agricultural sector, including the agricultural marketing 
boards and parastatals. From 1980 to 1989, the World Bank disbursed 13 financial 
assistance packages to Kenya for agricultural sector development and liberalization. 
One of the state-controlled boards that the World Bank and IMF wanted liberalized 
was the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). This request was first made in 
1982 as part of a US$13.2 million agricultural institutional development credit 
package to Kenya. The government did not reform the NCPB during the period of 
the credit, however. Reforming the NCPB remained a condition of the IFIs all 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (ADBG 2001). The World Bank and IMF 
complained about the failure of the government to reform the NCPB, but they 
continued to provide financial aid and technical assistance to the sector. This was an 
example where the government failed to adhere to a specific conditionality without 
suffering any significant adverse consequences 
 
While President Moi was exerting more control in the sector in order to 
consolidate his power and distribute largesse to his supporters, his government 
continued to receive substantial agricultural sector development loans and credits 




World Bank‘s operations in Kenya‘s agricultural sector]. Despite these loans and 
demands for reform from the IFIs, the sector remained highly controlled by the state, 
















1981 L1995/C1443 35.0 100 
1982 C1237 21.6 98 
 C1277 6.0 100 
1983 C1387 14.5 97 
1986 C1717/AFO21 60.0 100 
 C1718 13.2 115 
1988 C1974 21.9 105 






The IFIs were informed about the lack of progress toward reform. In fact, in 
1981, the World Bank noted a series of problems contributing to the ineffectiveness 
of its previous loans to Kenya and yet proceeded with a new $35 million loan/credit 
package to the government, the fourth loan/credit to the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC), one of two primary agricultural lending institutions in Kenya 
(the other was the Cooperative Bank of Kenya). The Project Performance Audit 
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Report and Project Impact Evaluation Report of the first loan/credit concluded that 
the projects supported by the financial package ―probably had only a marginal 
economic impact at the farm level and possibly even a slightly negative financial 
impact on AFC‖ (Bank 1981:14). While the AFC made some improvement on the 
second and third financial packages, lack of staff capacity and program coordination 
remained major problems. 
 
The first round (1980-1990) of IFI pressure on Kenya to reform the sector 
failed to produce the intended outcomes of privatizing or dismantling the marketing 
boards and opening up the market for private investors to compete. By 1990, the 
domestic political environment had begun to deteriorate, with increasing resistance 
against the Moi government, and Kikuyu and Luo farmers leaving formal 
government structures in protest. In order to relieve some of the pressures from the 
farmers and their allies, Kenya adopted a new agricultural reform program known as 
the Second Agricultural Adjustment Operation (ASAO II). ASAO II was to start in 
1992 and be completed in 1998. As will be explained below, this period was the 
most successful for reform in the sector. That timeframe corresponded with the 
periods from 1990-1995 and 1997-1999 during which the IFIs had suspended 
financial assistance to Kenya (Njehu 2003). The fact that reforms happened at a time 
when the World Bank and IMF had suspended their aid weakens the argument that 







4.4 Role and Functions of Marketing Boards and Cooperatives 
 
The colonial government allocated land and set up government-dominated 
marketing boards and cooperatives to control agriculture. The marketing boards were 
agencies empowered with legal authority over producers and purchasers of primary 
and processed agricultural products. They were also the primary agencies that set and 
controlled commodity prices. Marketing boards differed from co-operatives by their 
legal status and power to compel compliance to their rules and regulations (Abbott 
1967). Co-operatives could be established by either the government or independently 
by producers. Either way, co-operatives served as the link between the producers and 
boards. The boards were often the only purchaser of specified commodities in 
domestic markets. The stated goals of marketing boards and cooperatives were to 
promote economic development by providing necessary services to agricultural 
producers, services such as fertilizer, better seeds, information, and greater access to 
markets, and protection from unfair international competition (Abbott 1967; 
Nyangito 2001; Wanyama 2009).  
 
Due to lack of data, it is not clear how many boards Kenya had at 
independence, but by 1982, there were 108 boards regulating and setting prices in all 
sectors of the economy (Cohen 1993). In addition to their regulatory duties, they had 




domestic markets. The management of these structures resulted in price controls, 
inefficient subsidy programs, and overall mismanagement. After independence, these 
structures and the way in which they were managed were passed on to the Kenyan 
leaders. President Kenyatta took advantage of them to favor his ethnic Kikuyu 
community, and President Moi did the same in favor of his Kalenjin community 
(Kanyinga 1994; Holmquist et al. 1994). 
 
The political influence of the government and mismanagement of these 
structures led to protests against government intrusion in the agricultural sector, 
which resulted in reform of many of the boards. The reforms included stripping the 
boards of their monopoly powers, which meant allowing private actors to enter 
commodities markets to compete. Removing their monopoly powers also meant 
curbing the boards‘ authority to place controls on producers and buyers.  
 
Each of the major primary agricultural commodities had a marketing board. 
The Dairy Board of Kenya (DBK) and the Kenya Cooperative Creameries regulated 
the dairy market; the Kenya Tea Board (KTB) and the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority (KTDA) were responsible for the tea market; and the National Cereals and 
Produce Board (NCPB) regulated the wheat and other cereals markets. The 
government was heavily involved in running these boards, ranging from appointing 
managing directors to setting up prices that cooperatives had to pay to producers 




One of President Moi‘s interventions to control prices was to reduce prices 
paid to Kikuyu farmers for coffee and tea sold to the Kenya Tea Development 
Authority. It had been accepted practice that the better quality tea and coffee 
produced primarily in the Kikuyu-dominated Central Province would receive a 
higher price than the lower quality production from the Kalenjin-dominated Rift 
Valley. The Moi government also increased its control over the KTDA and replaced 
many management officials with Kalenjins. In addition, President Moi created 
Nyayo Tea Zones, which expanded areas of production for mostly Kalenjin farmers. 
All of these efforts were part of his strategy to replace Kikuyu dominance in the 




[President Moi] began to dismantle the ruling coalition that centered on the 
Kikuyu farming community. This coalition had been strongly committed to 
agricultural growth first and redistribution second. In its place, Moi favored a 
coalition based on his Kalenjin ethnic group and previously marginal groups. 
The new coalition favored redistribution from Kikuyu farmers and supported 
lower food prices after the urban revolt and coup attempt of 1982 (1997:141). 
 
 
Critics of government intervention in markets through the mechanisms of 
marketing boards, cooperatives, and price controls argued that such intervention 
distorted markets, deprived producers of the actual price for their products, and 
increased prices for consumers. They also argued that farmer representatives who 




pointed to President Moi‘s appointment of one of his nephews as Managing Director 
of the KTDA. He was not appointed because of his expertise in farming or 
commodities markets, but rather because of his relationship to Moi. Critics also 
noted his previous employment as the head of Kenya‘s Central Bank, a position for 
which he was not qualified either. The appointment of President Moi‘s nephew to 
head public institutions was the ultimate sign of nepotism in government and 
reinforced the complaints that people were making about public corruption (Gitau et 
al. 2008; Grosh 1994). 
 
 
4.5 Kenya Cooperative Creameries and Dairy Market 
 
The liberalization of Kenya‘s dairy market beginning in 1992 was a good 
example of how internal dynamics influenced reform. The dairy industry, dominated 
by small-scale farmers‘ herds produced 70 percent of total annual milk in Kenya. 
The dairy industry accounted for 14 percent of the agricultural GDP and 3.5 percent 
of the total GDP (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008). Prior to 1992, Kenya‘s dairy farmers 
had three major problems with the overregulated dairy market and the way in which 
the Moi government controlled the Kenya Creameries Cooperative (KCC).  
 
The farmers‘ first problem concerned government controls and regulations. 




meant they could not tell if they were getting accurate prices for what they sold. The 
key actors in the market were smallholder farmers who typically owned one to two 
milking cows; the government, through the Ministry of Cooperative Development 
(MoDC) and the Kenya Creameries Cooperative (KCC); and the dairy farmer 
cooperative societies (DFCSs). The DFCSs were made up of smallholder producers 
and prior to liberalization were required to register with the (MoDC). Once 
registered, the MoDC was responsible for the supervision of cooperatives‘ elections 
and financial accounts. MoDC also became responsible for approving capital 
expenditures and policies (Atieno and Kanyinga 2008). 
 
With such control over the registered DFCSs, MoDC‘s decisions were more 
often politically motivated than supervisory in the interests of smallholder producers. 
In addition to supervisory rules and regulations from MoDC, the DFCSs also had to 
directly engage the KCC, an agency that was supposedly made up of farmer 
representatives and government officials to regulate market-related issues such as 
prices and services to farmers. The KCC was the primary market outlet for dairy 
cooperatives and the main processor and purchaser of milk. It was also the only 
retailer of milk products in Kenya‘s urban areas (Burgess 1997; Owango et al. 1998).  
 
The second problem revolved around government appointment of board 
members to the KCC. The government appointed members not because of their 





While cooperative societies had a role in the appointment of directors, 
influential politicians neglected this and instead appointed those they 
thought were politically loyal to the government. At one time, those in 
the board of directors included the then President‘s family members 
and political allies. Appointment to the board was not based on 
someone‘s knowledge of dairy or cooperative issues. It was based on 
how close one was to the ruling elite. Those appointed, therefore, 
used their positions not to better the KCC but to acquire individual 
wealth. Their aim was to use their positions to make personal 




The third problem that dairy farmers had with the KCC concerned delayed 
payments. After selling their milk to the KCC, the DFCSs often went for months 
without payment, which in turn meant they could not pay the farmers on time. To 
avoid these problems, farmers left the formal cooperatives to create less formalized 
self-help groups (SHGs) to collect and market milk. One of the main advantages of 
these groups was that they could register with the Ministry of Culture and Social 
Services instead of the MoDC. As a result of registering with the Ministry of Culture 
and Social Services, the SHGs had few regulatory restrictions on their activities 
(Otieno and Kanyinga 2008). 
 
As the government exerted more control over the KCC and the Kenya Dairy 
Board (KDB), more farmers left the formalized agencies to establish independent 
farmer-led cooperatives and unions. In 1990, smallholder farmers in the Central 




unions. Farmers in the Kiambu and Murang‘a Districts established four independent 
cooperatives and unions. Smallholder farmers in Nyanza Province also began to 
bypass the formal state-controlled structures to seek agricultural assistance and 
services and free themselves from the state‘s constraints. Among the Nyanza 
Province farmers were the Uriri Farmers‘ Cooperative Society and Mugama 
Farmers‘ Cooperative. The flight of farmers from the KCC resulted in a budget crisis 
for the agency, as the amount of fees collected from farmers declined (Owango, 
Lukuyu, Staal, Kenyanjui, Njubi, and Thorpe 1998; Wanyama 2009). 
 
 
4.6 Reformed KCC and Dairy Market and other Agricultural Boards 
 
The farmers‘ message around government inefficiency and corruption with 
respect to managing these agencies fed into larger campaigns at the national level in 
1990 against the Moi government. Farmers and business groups sought to encourage 
the development of private dairy processors to create a more competitive dairy 
market that could raise producer prices. Before liberalization, when the KCC had 
legal monopoly over the purchase and sales of milk, the KCC was handling 90 
percent of all marketed processed milk in urban centers, and was also the major 
buyer at the farm level. In contrast, non-KCC dairies were processing only five 





In 1992, after pressure from farmers, including pressure brought about by 
their leaving of the formal board structures, the government lifted the monopoly 
powers of the KCC and restrictions on the dairy market. The government removed 
its subsidies to the KCC and encouraged market-based services to farmers. As a 
result of these reforms, more private milk processors and retailers entered the dairy 
market. The number of smallholders in farmer-led cooperative societies increased 
significantly in many districts in just a few years after the reforms (Owango et al. 
1998). Table 7 below shows the increases in the numbers of active cooperative 
society members from 1990 to 1995 and the increase in the percentage of private 
milk purchaser outlets that entered the market after liberalization of the sector. 
 
Table 7: Registered Active Membership of Dairy Farmers in Cooperative Societies 
and Milk Sales by Dairy Farmer Cooperative to Different Market Outlets in 1990 
and 1995, as mean percent by District 
 
 Kiambu Murang’a Thika 
1990 1995 1990 1995 1990 1995 
Registered Membership  33,410 40,491 14,400 33,479 7,618 9,781 
Market Outlets (% of 













KCC 49 24 71 72 92 48 
Retail 29 49 29 27 8 48 




While there may be a number of factors that contributed to the increase in 
membership in the farmers‘ cooperatives, the reforms were definitely one of them. 




registered membership in cooperatives. Murang‘a saw the largest increase, more than 
doubling its membership in five years, going from 14,400 registered members in 
1990 to 33,479. More milk retailers entered the market, which gave dairy farmers 
more choices in terms of market outlets to sell their milk. The KCC had to increase 
its price paid to DFCSs in an effort to maintain or increase its supply and be 
competitive (Staal and Shapiro 1994; Owango et al. 1998). 
 
In Thika, before liberalization, 92 percent of DFCS‘s milk was sold to the 
KCC and eight percent to other retail outlets. After liberalization made it legal for 
other retailers to enter the milk-buying and processing market, only 48 percent of 
Thika‘s DFCS‘s milk was sold to the KCC while other retail outlets saw their share 
increase from eight percent to 48 percent during the same period of 1990-1995. A 
major shift also took place in Kiambu during this period. DFCSs in Murang‘a did not 
shift their preference from the KCC to other retailers and it was not clear why. 
Overall, the availability of more choices of market outlets translated into significant 
reduction in the percentage of milk that DFCS farmers sold to the KCC and increase 
to the retailers since the reforms in 1992, as indicated in the table. 
 
Prices that DFCSs paid to their farmers also increased because milk prices 
increased in different markets after the reform. From 1990 to 1995, the average per 
liter prices paid by the DFCS to their members rose from approximately Kenyan 




(Owango et al. 1998:181). The loss of government subsidies and farmers‘ fees put 
considerable pressure on the KCC. As a result, the agency became severely indebted. 
It collapsed in 1998 and its assets were sold to private investors, many of whom were 
politicians or had political influence.
10
 After 1992, when the political system was 
liberalized, farmers pressed legislators for reform of other inefficient and corrupt 
marketing boards.  
 
Just as more investors joined the dairy market when the government was 
forced to lift KCC‘s monopoly powers so too was the case with the grains market 
when the government lifted the monopoly power of the Kenya Planters‘ Cooperative 
Union (KPCU) in 1993. Similar to other boards, the KPCU reforms included 
deregulating markets and prices, removing various restrictions on foreign exchange, 
and liberalizing interest rates (Nyangito 2001). 
 
Before 1993, the KPCU was responsible for all coffee milling. The agency 
was highly bureaucratic and inefficient as a result of rent-seeking activities. A 
coalition of farmers and business groups led a series of public education campaigns 
to press lawmakers to push for reform. Their efforts aimed at lifting the monopoly 
status of the KPCU, reducing the myriad bureaucratic procedures, eliminating rent-
seeking opportunities, and giving farmers more freedom in the market place. The 
                                                 
10
The (post-Moi) Kibaki government repurchased the KCC in 2003, reorganized it, and it is once 






public education efforts were successful in forcing the government to reform the 
KPCU. As a result of deregulating the coffee market and lifting the monopoly power 
of the KPCU, two new millers – Thika Coffee Miller and Scofina Miller – were 
licensed by the government to enter the market (Gitau, Kimenju, Kibaara, Nyoro, 
Bruntrup, and Zimmermann 2009).  
 
Significant reforms were also made in the National Cereals and Produce 
Board (NCPB). The government reduced its involvement in management and gave 
farmers greater control. Reforming the NCPB was a demand of small farmers who 
had argued that it was monopolistic and inefficient during the Moi presidency. They 
often would not receive payment for their crop until months or even a year after the 
sale (L. Kirimi, personal communication, August 10, 2010).  
 
By the end of 1992 the government also reformed the tea factories by 
eliminating the monopoly powers of the Kenya Tea Development Authority 
(KTDA). By 1998, the KTDA had become a management company, and each tea 
factory had become an independent company. As to the remaining assets of the 
Authority, 50 percent was retained by the new KTDA, 25 percent was divided evenly 
among the then 45 tea factory companies and the remaining 25 percent was 
distributed among the companies in accordance with the proportion of management 





The Agency managed 65 tea factories, and the large tea plantations organized 
into Kenya Tea Growers‘ Association, which covers about 31,017 hectares. 
However, smallholders produced over 60 percent of tea production and the sub-
sector accounts for 20 percent of Kenya‘s foreign exchange earnings (Ochieng 
2006). In addition to reforming these institutions, Kenya carried out reforms in many 
other sub-sectors. Table 8 below lists some of the reforms. 
 
 Many scholars and observers of Kenyan politics have offered alternate 
explanation, which credited aid suspension for the reforms in Kenya. The suspension 
of financial aid to Kenya may have played a role in pressuring the government to 
consider the reforms. However, if the suspension of aid did play a role, it was minor, 
considering the IFIs‘ past history of aid suspension to Kenya. For example, in 1982, 
the IMF/World Bank cancelled two loans totaling more than SDR 286 million 
because the Moi government was not adhering to the terms of the loans. These 
cancellations did not result in agricultural reform. The following year, 1983, the IFIs 
provided Kenya with a stand-by loan SDR 175.9 million, and they went on to 
disburse four additional loans to Kenya between 1985 and 1989, totaling SDR 367.1 
(O'Brien and Ryan 2001). Both, aid suspension and enticement did not lead to 
reform in the 1980s. The key difference between the 1980s and 1990s was the level 




Table 8: Selected Reforms in Agricultural Sector, 1992-1994 
 
Commodity Policy Before Change Change 
Year 
After Change 
Coffee/Tea  Auction marketing by boards 




 Foreign currency allowed 
 
Maize  NCPB as the only importer with controls 
on producer prices 
 NCPB maintained strategic grains 
reserves 
 Private importers allowed but variable duty imposed 




 Price controls 
 KCC had monopoly in processing 
marketing 
 Kenya Dairy Board had monopoly over 
imports 
 Decontrolled prices 
 Liberalized entry for private sector investors in 
processing and marketing 
 
Cotton  Price controls 
 Restrictions on domestic marketing and 
trade 
 
 Complete deregulation of domestic 
marketing/pricing 
 
Sugar  Controls on producer prices and imports  
1994 
 Minimum prices and new tariffs set to protect 
domestic producers 
 
Wheat  NCPB as only importer  
 Producer price controls 
 Minimum (floor) prices set based on long-term 
import parity prices and imports controls 





The liberalization of Kenya‘s agricultural sector supported some of the 
arguments that proponents of liberalization have made with respect to increased 
competition, efficiency, and pricing. Producers who, prior to liberalization, had to 
sell their products to cooperatives, which then sold them to government agencies that 
in turn sold them at an auction for export and domestic retail found the process much 
simpler. Under the pre-liberalization system, many of the producers received their 
payments in installments, and the final price they received was based on the average 
price for the season. After 1992, when most of the agricultural sub-sectors (milk, 
coffee, and tea) were liberalized and the pricing system was changed, more private 
investors entered the different markets resulting in increased competition and 
producers receiving one payment that reflected the actual price of their products 




4.7 Ending Subsidies to Farmers 
 
 
 Farmers and business groups sought the elimination of subsidies as part of 
the broader movement to address public corruption. They argued that the subsidies 
were inefficient and consistently failed to reach their goals. The failure of subsidy 
programs was illustrated in the milk (dairy) sub-sector. Smallholder herds produced 
60 percent of milk in Kenya. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the government put 




National Artificial Insemination Service (KNAIS). The program achieved 548,000 
inseminations in 1979 at an average cost to the government of KSh 130 per 
pregnancy, though the cost ranged from KSh 30 to KSh 1,300. The farmer, on the 
other hand, was paying as little as KSh 1 to 2.20 per insemination. Despite the high 
level of government subsidy, inseminations dropped by 20 percent every year from 
1980 to 1985, proving government critics correct that subsidies were not effective. 
The cost to the government was projected to substantially increase by 2000, from 
Kenyan pound (K£) 1.7 million to K£4.5 million (Kenya 1988:73). 
 
The economic crisis that Kenya was experiencing and public pressure forced 
the government, in 1985, to make dairy farmers pay more for artificial insemination 
services. The government reduced its subsidies and argued for cost sharing with 
farmers. The idea of greater cost sharing has evolved in the post-1992 period but the 
same principle of reducing government subsidies has remained (Kenya 1988). A 
study conducted in the first few years after liberalization of the sub-sector and 
reduction of government subsidies showed that farmers‘ access to artificial 
insemination increased significantly in the districts studied. In Kiambu, the number 
of active dairy cooperative farmers with access to artificial insemination service went 








from zero to 10,276; and in the Thika District, it went from zero to 1,690. These 
increases in the number of farmers with access to greater services were the result of 
more private service providers entering the market after liberalization (Owango et al. 
1998:177). 
 
In 1996, the government argued that it needed to reduce subsidies provided to 
farmers as a way to reduce public expenditure and better manage public resources. 
The government even sought to recover some subsidies by imposing user-fees or 
what it called ―cost-recovery‖ fees in some cases. Critics of the IFIs argued that the 
―user-fee‖ came from the World Bank and the IMF. The critics may be partly 
correct, but government documents written in the late 1970s and early1980s (1979-
1983 Development Plan) showed that Kenya was using terms that were analogous to 
―user-fee.‖ Also, Kenya‘s Sessional Paper No.1 of 1986 used ―participant support‖ 
to help finance the recurrent costs of government services. Sessional Paper No.1 also 
noted: ―Government has long charged fees for certain services‖ (Kenya 1988:29). In 
1997, the term ―cost-recovery‖ was used. As Kenya‘s 1997-2001 Development Plan 
put it: 
 
[T]he Government is rationalizing public expenditure through the 
evolution of better public financial resources management. Where 
feasible, gradual cost-recovery on all market-oriented public services 
has been imposed. Furthermore, only core public project are being 







The various reforms that took place were beneficial to farmers but it does not 
mean that all farmers enjoyed the benefits or that there were not unintended 
consequences. In the coffee subsector, for example, after the liberalization of the 
foreign exchange market, cooperative societies were paid in foreign currency by the 
Coffee Board of Kenya and were allowed to maintain foreign exchange accounts. 
However, as Hezron (2001) points out, most small-scale farmers were paid through 
their cooperatives in local currency, which meant they did not ―directly benefit from 
payments in foreign exchange for coffee exports‖ (15). While liberalization helped to 
remove implicit government controls induced taxes on coffee earnings, ―farmers still 
complain[ed] about the prices they receive[d] possibly because of high deductions 
made by societies and ineffective management of the societies and factories‖ 
(Hezron 2001:15).  
 
Another group of farmers who did not benefit or were possibly adversely 
affected by liberalization were those in remote areas. Before liberalization, the 
government subsidized the transportation costs of their product, but with the end of 
subsidies, these farmers were less likely to be able to reach markets in urban centers 
or those who managed to make it received a lower price for their milk due to the 









Kenya undertook the reforms that this chapter highlighted because of 
pressures from the domestic actors who were fed up with inefficient and repressive 
government policies. External actors helped the process either by providing support 
or by withholding support to the government. The chapter explained the importance 
of the agricultural sector to Kenya‘s economy and society, an importance that all of 
the actors recognized, making reforming even more urgent. Small-scale farmers took 
an active role in the reform movement and their reform campaigns intersected with 
national campaigns against the Moi government creating a broad coalition for change 
in Kenya.  
 
Among the most important of the reforms in the agricultural sector was the 
striping of the government-controlled cooperatives and marketing boards of their 
monopoly powers, which paved the way for new and private investors to enter the 
market. Reforming the Kenya Creameries Cooperative and opening the diary market 
to competition resulted in increased membership in farmers‘ cooperatives and 
increased prices for dairy farmers. In the reform efforts, the IMF and World Bank 
provided significant financial support to the sector but, as the chapter noted, it was 
not their financial support that drove the reform process and its success. The chapter 






performance reports - showing the government lack of compliance with the World 
Bank/IMF‘s conditionality terms, which frustrated the donor institutions. 
 
Growing frustration among small-scale farmers and business groups about 
government inefficiency and corruption led them to agitate against the government 
and demand reform. Their demands coincided with the then-developing narrative of 
government corruption, which increased pressure on the government for reform. As 
more farmers refrained from participating in the government controlled marketing 
boards and cooperatives, these agencies faced deep financial crises and the 
government conceded to reforming them. The government faced a similar situation 





























PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION:  




Based on the explanations of the different forms of privatization discussed in 
the previous chapter, this chapter on financial sector reforms similarly explores the 
role of internal actors and factors and external actors in reducing state involvement in 
the economy through lifting controls on foreign exchange and investors, and through 
privatization of (divestiture from) state-owned banks and non-banks financial 
institutions (NBFIs).  
 
Despite receiving substantial amount of financial assistance from the IMF 
and World Bank for more than two decades to undertake reforms, Kenya neglected 
the institutions‘ major policy recommendations with no apparent trepidation about 
the threats of aid suspension. The IMF has acknowledged that under the Moi 
presidency Kenya did not implement its policy advice. In an evaluation report 
written in 2004, the IMF said, [b]efore 2003, ―pervasive governance problems and 
weak political commitment to economic reforms did not provide a favorable 
environment for the implementation of Fund policy advice‖ (IMF 2009:5).
11
 Despite 
                                                 
11The Moi presidency ended at the end of 2002. The report was referring to the IMF’s 
challenging history with the Moi government and assessing the prospects for better engagement 




the lack of implementation of IMF policy recommendations and the perceived ―weak 
political commitment to economic reforms,‖ Kenya did carry out a number of 
economic and political reforms persistently demanded by internal agitators.  
 
This chapter explores the weakness of the threats of aid suspension, and even 
actual aid suspension, and suggests that conditionality around financial aid assistance 
cannot be said to have been the main factor pushing the Moi government toward 
liberalization of the financial sector.  
 
The chapter starts by explaining how the state became involved in the 
financial sector and how the state‘s role shifted from what some have called ―a 
benevolent guiding hand‖ to less involvement (Mwale 2000:59). This shift was 
indicated by the privatization of state-owned parastatals and lifting of restrictions on 
private entrepreneurs‘ entrance to the market. After this explanation of the shifting 
role of the state in the sector, the discussions focus on three areas that illustrate the 
primacy of internal pressure in forcing President Moi to reform the financial sector 
by reducing the role of the state: (1) the state preference for domestic businesses by 
imposing controls on foreign investors and the subsequent lifting of restrictions as a 
result of popular pressure, (2) privatization of state-owned financial institutions and 








5.1  Shifting Role of the State in the Financial Sector 
 
 
The government took a trusteeship, or a guiding role in the financial sector, 
soon after independence, a role that the government explained in its Sessional Paper 
No.10 of 1965. Three important points related to the financial sector can be 
extrapolated from the Sessional Paper: (1) Kenya welcomed foreign investors as long 
as they were willing to allow Kenyans to own shares in their businesses and be hired 
in management positions, (2) Kenya intended to pursue a very selective 
nationalization, including buying minority shares or taking full control of businesses 
that were important to economic development, and (3) Kenya promised that state-
owned businesses ―would be operated efficiently, covering their costs, and 
contributing a profit‖ to the Treasury (Mwale 2000:62). These stipulations in the 
Sessional Paper were followed by a number of government policies that targeted 
specific businesses in which to buy majority or minority shares.   
 
 Initially there was widespread support for the state to be involved in the 
economy through ownership of companies. State ownership was seen by the public 
and the government as a way to support nascent national and local businesses. Some 
influential political leaders at the time saw state ownership of companies as a way 
for the state to have control over Kenya‘s resources for redistributive purposes. By 
the end of the 1970s, the government owned equity shares in 250 businesses and was 





 However, the trusteeship, or guiding role that the Kenyatta government took 
in the financial sector, increasingly became viewed as favoring the Kikuyu business 
community over other ethnic groups. ―Africanization in manufacturing and 
commerce was seen as covertly favoring the Kikuyu in the late 1960s, and overtly so 
in the first half of the 1970s‖ (Mwale 2000:81 [endnote 9]). By the mid-1970s, the 
state became very controlling in the economy, leading to widespread complaints of 
public corruption, ethnic nepotism, and institutional inefficiency. Institutional 
inefficiency contradicted the third point of the Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 
requiring that state-owned businesses would be run so efficiently as to make a profit 
greater than the foregone taxes the Treasury would have collected had they been 
private companies. 
 
Managing the companies—companies that eventually were not profitable, as 
broadly predicted by proponents of liberalization—required significant public 
resources. The increase in public sector expenditure to maintain the state-owned 
businesses, as well as expansion of central and local government services, resulted in 
a major increase in the public sector. The share of public sector employment, for 
example, rose from 29 percent in 1963 to 39 percent in 1973, and was almost 50 
percent in the early 1980s (Ikiara 2000:42). Critics of the Kenyatta government 
pointed to ethnic imbalances in public-sector employment and support of local 




through ownership of companies and he also practiced ethnic favoritism (Jonyo 
2002; Himbara 1994). 
 
 




One of the primary mechanisms of controls was the Exchange Control Act, 
under which the Central Bank of Kenya was the sole agency with authority to 
transact in foreign currency. The Central Bank licensed commercial banks to handle 
foreign currencies on behalf of their clients. The commercial banks were required to 
sell all foreign currencies to the Central Bank within a specified period. It was illegal 
for individuals and/or firms to possess or trade in foreign currency without 
permission from the Central Bank. All exports out of Kenya had to be declared and 
foreign exchange earnings from such exports had to go through licensed commercial 
banks to be converted to Kenyan shillings before they were transferred to the 
exporters. Importers who needed foreign currencies to pay for imports or other 
international obligations had to apply for import licenses from the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. The application then had to be approved by the Central 
Bank. The process could take months and even then, obtaining foreign currencies for 
imports was not always assured because of the abuse and corruption in the import 





In addition to foreign exchange controls, the government imposed a series of 
restrictions on foreign companies to discourage them from repatriating their profits. 
The government reasoned that if the foreign companies were barred from repatriating 
their profits they would instead invest more in Kenya. Foreign companies that did 
not reinvest a high percentage of their profit in Kenya saw their borrowing rights 
restricted by the government. As a penalty, the offending foreign companies‘ 
borrowing from commercial banks in Kenya was capped at 20 percent of their total 
investment, while African firms were allowed to borrow up to 40 percent of their 
total investment. It was argued that the restrictions on foreign companies and 
preferential treatment toward Kenyan businesses were necessary to give the domestic 
businesses access to capital to level the playing field with foreign-owned businesses 
so that they could compete (Swainson 1977). Post-independence debates around 
building domestic capital dominated Kenya‘s political scene. Observers of Kenyan 
politics paid attention to the fact that Kikuyu businesses, which were becoming the 
heart of the new Kenyan bourgeois, were the primary benefactors of these policies 
and that members of the Kikuyu community were the ―leading industrial capitalists‖ 
in the 1970s (Himbara 1994:476). 
 
The government also used the Trade Licensing Act and the Import-Export 
and Essential Supplies Act to further restrict foreign investors while promoting 
domestic businesses. The Trade Licensing Act proscribed non-Africans from trading 




non-citizens could conduct business only in Nairobi, Mombasa, and other major 
cities and towns. The Act proved to be successful in shifting businesses from non-
Kenyans to Kenyans. For example, Kitale, a town in Western Kenya saw an 80 
percent turnover of businesses from non-Kenyans to Kenyans from 1967 to 1969 
(Muller 1981). The Import-Export and Essential Supplies Act gave the Kenya 
National Trade Corporation (KNTC) monopoly power over wholesale and retail 
commodities trading, which became the main agency responsible for assisting 
Kenyans in all aspects of trading (Brownbridge and Harvey 1998; Himbara 1994). 
 
The new policies of the Kenyatta government helped to create a new business 
class made up of predominantly Kikuyu. The top managers in the parastatals were 
Kikuyu and prominent public positions were also filled with Kikuyu. ―The most 
successful Kikuyu capitalists were notables in President Kenyatta‘s own family or in 
key state institutions‖ (Himbara 1994:477). This class was instrumental in utilizing 
the state to accumulate capital and develop itself as an indigenous Kenyan 
bourgeoisie. Government positions were filled with members of Kenyatta ethnic 
group included the Chairman of Kenya Commercial Bank, Chairman of the ICDC, 
the Minister of Finance (current President of Kenya), and the Governor of the 
Central Bank of Kenya (Himbara 1994).   
 
When Moi came to power at the end of 1978, he maintained the policies of 




government shifted domestic preferences from the Kikuyu to Kalenjin, Moi‘s ethnic 
group. This shift in ethnic preference under President Moi undermined the Kikuyu-
dominated entrepreneurial and political classes. As was the case in the agricultural 
sector, in his bid to consolidate power, President Moi ―removed most of the members 
of the Kikuyu elite from state positions in a wholesale fashion‖ (Himbara 1994:477). 
Those in the Kenyatta government who had access to state financing and other state-
supported credit lost their privileges and President Moi replaced them with Kalenjins 
and party loyalists. ―The transfer of power from Kenyatta to Moi presidency 
adversely affected many would-be African industrialists and commercial 
entrepreneurs who appeared promising in the 1970s‖ (Himbara 1994:470), referring 
to the then-emerging Kikuyu entrepreneurial class. 
 
 
5.3  Lifting Controls on Foreign Exchange and Investors 
 
At the start of the efforts to liberalize the sector in 1980, Kenya had a 
relatively well-developed financial sector consisting of the Central Bank, 16 
commercial banks, five development banks, 15 non-Bank financial institutions, 
several other financial intermediaries, and a securities exchange. The Kenyan 






 development banks, and the specialized institutions lending to agriculture, tourism 
and housing. It also owned shares in several commercial banks and two development 
banks (Bank 1981:10). 
 
By the early1980s, high inflation and public debt, mismanagement of 
financial institutions, and government restrictions created an unstable 
macroeconomic environment in need of reform. Much of Kenya‘s deteriorating and 
unstable macroeconomic condition was also due to adverse effects of the world 
economic recession in the late 1970s—effects that began to be felt in the early 1980s 
with low foreign investment in Kenya. Economic growth also suffered. The average 
annual growth rates of real gross domestic product declined from 5.2 percent 
between 1974 and 1979 to 4.1 between 1980 and 1989 and further declined to 2.5 
percent between 1990 and 1995 (Kenya 1997).  
 
Government critics, especially in the Kikuyu entrepreneur community, 
argued that government controls and corruption hampered investments. Policies of 
controls and shifts in government preferences led to many Kikuyu losing their 
privileged economic and political positions in the 1980s as President Moi 
consolidated his power. In retaliation and to discredit Moi‘s policies in favor of the 
tenets of liberalization, this entrepreneur community embraced what came to be 
called the ―get the government off our backs‖ position that liberalization promotes 





Holmquist et al. (1994) noted a certain irony in the strong appeal of ―get the 
government off our backs‖ to the non-Kalenjin who ―were, in the recent past, major 
beneficiaries of state largesse—some literally almost creatures of the state—but who 
now feel isolated from it with the new ethnic make-up of the state sector under Moi‖ 
(98). The Moi government came under pressure and was blamed for the economic 
decline. Calls to lift controls on investors became part of the national movement for 
reform. When the IFIs began to engage with the Moi government on reform, they 
found in Kenya a large and influential segment of the business and international 
finance community that was ready and could align with them to press the 
government. ―The result was a formidable de facto alliance between this element 
[Kikuyu business class] and the external donors […] mandating a shrinking of the 
state and the presumed liberation of market forces in its wake‖ (Holmquist et al. 
1994:98). 
 
As early as the late 1970s, before the IMF and the World Bank began to 
promote liberalization in Kenya, the government was drafting plans to reform. The 
authors of Kenya‘s 1979-1983 Development Plan argued for greater reliance on 
markets and for improving the efficiency of the public sector as way to respond to 
the economic crisis that began after the 1973 oil shock. The government started to 
liberalize Kenya‘s financial sector during that time to make it a friendlier 




key changes indicating government liberalization efforts. In 1983, Kenya lifted some 
restrictions on repatriation of foreign investors‘ dividends and profits. In 1984, the 
Central Bank reduced taxes on royalties and dividend income to help create a 
friendly business environment. In 1986, Kenya revised its Foreign Investment Act to 
attract foreign investment. In 1993, the government removed more barriers on 
foreign exchange to attract foreign direct investment and to enhance Kenya‘s export 
markets. Virtually all of these reform happened without significant pressures from 
the external actors (Kenya 1997; Lehman 1992). 
 
In 1995, Kenya lifted all controls on foreign exchange transactions and 
foreign investors by repealing the Exchange Control Act, which enabled more 
private investors to enter the foreign exchange market by securing licenses from the 
Central Bank to establish foreign exchange bureaux. By 1996, Kenya had 13 private 
Foreign Exchange Bureaux, which grew to more than 30 by 1999, making 
international transactions easier for investors (Kenya 1997; Barkan 1995; Central 





Table 9: Liberalizing Changes: Creating a Business-Friendly Environment 
 
Year Description of Policy Changes 
1983 The Central Bank introduced policy to allow repatriation of foreign investors' dividends and profit payments for 1982.  
 
1984 The Central Bank lowered taxes on royalties and dividend income. 
 
1986 The government revised the Foreign Investment Act to encourage foreign capital/investment in the technology sector. 
 
1987 The Minister of Finance, in the 1987 Budget Speech, called on foreign investors to invest in Kenya and promised them a 
friendly business environment. 
 
1988 The government provided increased tax incentives, private capital investment, and revised the Foreign Investment 
Protection Act to allow foreign exchange losses on hard currency investments to be tax-deductible. 
 
Kenya also signed the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank, promising not to impose 
noncommercial risks to foreign enterprises/investors. 
 
1989 Government passed the Restrictive Practices and Monopolies Commission Act to ensure fair trade, economic competition, 
and market conduct. 
 





1994 Six banks and 11 NBFIs were ordered liquidated or restructured by the CBK because of serious violations of Kenya‘s 
banking regulations. 
 
Kenya signed IMF‘s Article VIII and its currency became convertible. 
 
1995 Kenya lifted controls on international transactions on its current account. 
 
1996 The government amended the Central Bank Act to give it more authority/independence. 
 
1998 Five major financial institutions experienced crises requiring the Central Bank to take supervisory actions by putting them 
under statutory management. 
 
2000 The IMF required conditionality for several financial sector reforms, including amendments to the Banking Act to control 
fraud, issuing of prudential regulations, reviewing deposit insurance, strengthening CBK supervisory authority, and 
privatizing the then state-owned Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB). 
 
Structural fiscal conditionality targeted the improvement of expenditure commitment and control, reducing arrears, 
improving pay for external audit staff, and timely submission of audited accounts to parliament. 





5.4  Parastatals and Privatization of Financial Institutions 
 
As the state-owned financial institutions (banks and non-banks) sought to 
assist local businesses, they became saddled with non-performing loans. These 
institutions included two commercial banks, nine development finance institutions, 
and over 20 NBFIs (Brownbridge 1998; Himbara 1994). Among the major loan-
issuing financial institutions were the Kenya National Bank, the Commercial Bank 
of Kenya, the Industrial Development Bank (IDB), the Joint Loan Boards (JLBs), 
and the Development Finance Corporation of Kenya (DFCK), and the Industrial and 
Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC). The ICDC was to provide various 
types of loans to Kenyans—commercial loans to enable them to expand their 
businesses, property loans to allow them to acquire or build commercial premises, 
and ―share-holding loans to enable Africans to purchase shares in larger existing 
companies‖ (Himbara 1994:472). In 1971, the Kenyan government took a 40 percent 
share in the foreign bank National and Grindlays to form the Kenyan National 
Commercial Bank (Swainson 1980).  
 
The newly independent government recognized the importance of foreign 
businesses as ―wealth creators‖ and as a modernizing force for Kenya‘s economy but 
it did not want Kenya‘s development to rely solely on them. ―Such a reliance on 




importantly, politically unacceptable‖ (Himbara 1994:470). Therefore, soon after 
independence, the government announced policies to replace ex-colonial 
administrators with Kenyans, policies that have been characterized as 
―Kenyanization‖ or ―Africanization‖ of the economy. The policies involved the use 
of the state-owned financial institutions to provide access to credit and finance 
services to Kenyan businesses, services that they were not able to access during the 
colonial period (Grosh 1991; Muller 1981).  
 
The transfer of foreigners‘ businesses to Kenyans under the Trade Licensing 
Act and the state‘s efforts to have Kenyans lead public companies, did not help 
Kenya build a strong indigenous capital base, as the proponents of ―Kenyanizing‖ of 
the economy thought. Despite government support of domestic businesses through 
state policies and financial assistance through loan-issuing parastatals, the local 
businesses were not sustainable. In 1973, a government official publicly expressed 
―worry over the deterioration of financial control and general efficiency of public 
enterprises‖ (Mwale 2000:65), putting at risk not only the public enterprises 
themselves but also the local businesses that they were supposed to support. 
 
The failure of the local businesses was due to lack of managerial experience, 
mismanagement, and general economic decline in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Managers of the businesses did not have the necessary experience and yet were 




directors [were] appointed to parastatals for political reasons that have nothing to do 
with their ability to head the firm in question‖ (155). Himbara (1994) also notes that 
―[m]ost of the firms associated with [the parastatals] were inefficient, poorly 
managed, unprofitable, and a burden on the taxpayer on account of heavy budgetary 
subsidies made to them year after year‖ (474-5). Most of the portfolios of the two 
major loan-issuing parastatals were either in arrears or nonperforming. Some loans 
had to be cancelled because the clients were in default (Himbara 1994).  
 
Political and economic pressures (discussed in chapter three) reflected in the 
financial sector and forced President Moi to concede to reform. As public corruption 
and ethnic nepotism was rampant, the public demanded financial reforms. After 
having taken steps to deregulate financial markets and lift controls on investors, 
domestic investors, too, increased their involvement in the sector. With their 
increased involvement came power to challenge the Moi government for favorable 
policies and reform. Their influence increased as they ventured into commercial 
banking. Kenya‘s domestic investors went from owning zero commercial banks in 
1980 to owning four in 1985, which increased to seven in 1991 and 17 by 1994. At 
the time, these 17 commercial banks represented a 25 percent share of the deposit 
market. Kenya‘s domestic investors grew even stronger in the nonbank financial 
institutions industry. These investors went from owning eight NBFIs in 1980 to 24 in 
1985 and 35 in 1994 and holding a 50 percent share of the deposit market (Daumont, 






This internal entrepreneurial class was more influential than external actors in 
pushing the government to reform the sector, as reform in the sector would naturally 
increase the client base of the domestic entrepreneurs‘ businesses. The government 
began such institutional reform—that is, privatizing and/or divesting from state-
owned institutions to reduce its involvement in the economy—in the late 1980s. 
Privatization of Kenya‘s Commercial Bank, for example, a bank that had the most 
branches in rural communities, meant that these entrepreneurs would become owners 
of many of these branches and be able to expand their businesses.  
 
In 1988, the government divested a 40 percent share from the Kenya 
Commercial Bank (KCB). From 1988 to 1997, the government divested from three 
additional banks, two development finance corporations, and eight subsidiaries of the 
KCB (see Table 8 below) primarily through the method of public flotation. The 
reason for the government‘s choice of divestiture through flotation was unclear, but 
since divestiture is the strongest way to show commitment to transparency and 
private sector involvement (Ngugi 2000), it is reasonable to argue that the Moi 
government sought to reduce the pressure that it was under between 1988 and 1990, 
trying to show to the public that it was committed to reform and transparency. 
Divestiture through flotation is also highly susceptible to political pressure by 




was under considerable pressure from many sources: Transportation Minister Matiba 
resigned from his government, labor strikes were on the increase, and the non-


























































Kenya Commercial Finance Corp* 
United Finance Company of Kenya* 
Notcutt Longatoni* 
Savings and Loan Kenya Ltd* 




















Source: (World Bank 2001
                                                 
12(*) These were subsidiaries and associated companies of Kenya Commercial Bank. The Moi government partially divested from KCB in 1988 and 
1990 before the IFIs-funded Parastatals Reform Technical Assistance Program of 1992. These subsidiaries and associated companies were 





5.5  Addressing Public-Sector Corruption  
 
The history of IFI conditionality-related aid and the frequency with which 
scholars have pointed out its limitations in forcing countries to adopt reform further 
strengthens the case for greater consideration of domestic actors‘ role in bringing 
about reform. When the Kenyan government received its first concessional loan from 
the World Bank in 1980, it agreed to address corruption and reform its civil service 
sector by reducing the number of state employees. But the state did not reform the 
sector as pledged. Instead, the civil service sector expanded, as illustrated in Table 
10 below. Kenya went from having 200,000 public employees in 1963 to over 
500,000 by 1982 and to more than 715,000 in 1991. 
 
Table 11: Employment in Public Sector: 1962, 1982, and 1991 
 
 1963 1982 1991 
Public sector (‗000s) 200.4 505.6 715.1 
Private sector (‗000s) 385.0 540.4 726.6 
    
% Public of total employment 34.2 48.2 49.6 
Source: (Cohen 1993:452) 
 
Increases in public sector employment resulted in a large percentage of the 
national budget being allocated for salaries and benefits. During the 1991-1992 fiscal 




fiscal resources were allocated to the recurrent budget. In 1993, after excluding debt 
servicing, principal and interests, 59 percent of recurrent budget was spent on wages, 
salaries, and other benefits for public sector employees (Cohen 1993:453).  
 
Government ministries went from 23 in 1982 to 31 by 1991 even when the 
number of departments decreased from ten to six during the same period. 
Government wholly owned parastatals went from 69 to 71 and government majority 
shares in others increased from 111 to 120 during the 1982-1991 period (Cohen 
1993:451). According to Bigsten and Moene, unnecessary positions were added at 
the Permanent Secretary and ministerial levels. Politically powerful ministries were 
spending beyond budgetary limits. Part of the money was used to finance parastatals 
that created employment slots to be allocated to allies of the government‘s 
―supporting coalition‖ even if they did ―not meet the required qualifications‖ 
(1993:181). 
 
Some argued that the expansion of the public bureaucracy was a strategy of 
the ruling elites to maintain their ruling coalition (Bigsten and Moene 1993), which 
if it were done properly would be considered normal as in any typical parliamentary 
system in need of a coalition to form a government; but others posited that the 
increases in public employment and expenditures were indicative of public 
corruption and ethnic favoritism because most of those employed were Kalenjin and 




members of the Kalenjin ethnic group disproportionately occupied cabinet posts and 
permanent secretaries during the Moi presidency as evidence for their claims of 
corruption and ethnic favoritism. It was within this context of increased public sector 
employment during the Moi presidency that internal actors demanded reforms to 
combat corruption in government.   
 
Despite the failure to address public sector corruption, Kenya continued to 
receive financial assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. The IMF exhibited 
similar weaknesses to the World Bank in its programs with respect to the power of 
conditionality to force Kenya to embrace liberalization during the Moi presidency. 
The IMF financial aid to Kenya was for broad structural reform, including for 
reforming the public sector and combatting corruption (IMF 2008). 
 
From 1980 to 2000, Kenya received 12 loans from the IMF (some joint with 
the World Bank) totaling special drawing rights (SDRs) 922 million (see Appendix 
D).
13
 Kenya was number seven among the top ten countries classified as having 
―prolonged use of IMF resources,‖ from the time it entered its first program in 1975 
to 2000. Prolonged use was defined as having spent at least seven years out of any 
ten years under IMF arrangements. Kenya spent 19.2 years and all of its 
arrangements (loans) were over 100 percent of its quota (IMF 2002:24+29). 
 
                                                 
13Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset created by the IMF and credited 




Similar to the World Bank, ―[w]hen a country borrows from the IMF, it 
agrees to adjust its economic policies to overcome the problems that led it to seek 
funding in the first place‖ (www.imf.org). Given these facts and in light of the 
influence that many scholars have ascribed to the IMF, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the IMF should have had considerable control over Kenya‘s policy 
decisions during the Moi presidency. Yet the IMF complained in 2004 that its policy 
recommendations regarding corruption and good governance practices were not 
implemented during the Moi period (IMF 2009).  
 
The World Bank, too, acknowledged the weaknesses of its programs and 
complained that lack of ownership on the part of the Moi government prevented the 
implementation of its policy recommendations. A review of its support to Kenya 
going back to 1961 pointed to mixed results with respect to effectiveness, outcomes, 
institutional development and sustainability. It listed poor design and inadequate 
ownership among the stakeholders, including some in the government (Bank 1998).  
 
It was not the first time that both the World Bank and IMF fell short of their 
objectives in Kenya and yet the institutions continued to disburse financial aid. The 
Moi government knew this and therefore the threats from the IFIs to suspend 
financial aid were not a significant factor in pushing the government toward 
reforming the public sector and addressing government corruption. Continued to get 




good governance practices, which the IMF argued were ―key to improving Kenya‘s 
economic performance,‖ the institutions suspended their financial aid for most of the 
1990s (Bank 1998; IMF 2009:5). Despite the suspension of financial aid, however, 
Kenya continued with reforms to combat public sector corruption, indicating that it 
was not the IMF and the World Bank that were the primary actors pushing it to 
undertake such reforms. 
 
 
5.6  Conclusion  
 
  
The goal of this chapter was to show how domestic pressures, especially 
pressures from the non-Kalenjin business elite, combined with pressures from a 
failing economy, and the external actors linked to broader national campaigns to 
push the Moi government to concede to reform. Having been alienated from their 
privileged political and economic positions by Moi, members of the Kikuyu political 
and economic elite and allies protested and demanded reforms. Their agitation and 
demands coincided with efforts by the IMF and the World Bank and the two sets of 
actors created an alliance of convenience. Absent of the efforts of the internal actors, 
the IFIs would not be in position to significantly influence Kenya‘s behavior toward 






The external actors could not move Kenya toward liberalization despite the 
influence they were said to have because of their financial power and conditionality 
they imposed. However, evidence provided in this chapter suggested that 
conditionality as a tool had limited influence in forcing Kenya to embrace 
liberalization. Rather than external actors, the chapter argued that internal pressures 
were more influential in forcing the Moi government toward reform. As economic 
conditions deteriorated and various groups got agitated because they lost their 
privileged positions in Kenya‘s deeply-rooted ethnic rivalry, the Moi government 
was forced to concede to reforms. The government started by lifting controls on 
investors in 1983, deregulating financial markets, and divesting from state-owned 
financial institutions as the decade wore on. These reforms led to greater shares of 



















CONCLUSION: THE LIMITS OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE AND THE  




6.1 Concluding Analysis 
 
The conventional explanation for developing nations undertaking reform has 
focused on external actors, the underlying rationale being that developing countries 
over the last 30 years have been forced by the IFIs to reform by virtue of their 
dependence on the IFIs for development aid. This explanation certainly has some 
merit but it also underrepresents the work and influence of domestic actors and 
conditions in bringing about political and economic reform. The merits and 
shortcomings of the IFI-influence argument have been examined exhaustively in a 
number of other studies, and some are discussed in Chapter One of this dissertation. 
The IFI-influence explanation is only part of the story in Kenya‘s case, however. It is 
only part of the story in Kenya because of the compelling domestic factors at play 






The emphasis on the role of domestic actors and factors in bringing about 
liberalization in Kenya puts in context the role the external actors had played. When 
considering the role of external actors in the context of Kenya‘s history dating back 
to colonialism and postcolonial politics, it becomes clear that the IFIs‘ influence in 
bringing about liberalization was complementary and secondary. In fact, well before 
domestic actors‘ agitation for reform reached its peak in 1990, for over ten years the 
IFIs and Kenya had engaged in an on-again off-again relationship without realizing 
any substantial reform.  
 
What can be deduced, however, based on the length of time the IFIs have 
been involved in Kenya and the level of assistance they have provided, is that if they 
had more influence than domestic actors or were the primary drivers of 
liberalization, as many have argued, Kenya would have been a ―model student.‖ The 
reforms the IFIs demanded would have been implemented easily and with a high rate 
of success. This was not the case, however, under President Moi. Instead, the 
relationship between the IFIs and Kenya turned out to be frustrating and contentious, 
indicating the limited nature of the power of the IFIs to force their will on Kenya.  
 
Illustrative of the stalemate was the IMF‘s offer to loan staff to the Kenyan 
government to help it write legislation. The IMF made the offer because it was 
frustrated that the government was not moving fast enough on reforms. But the 




more time to evaluate them. The offer was turned down, and even civic organizations 
that were generally supportive of the IMF‘s efforts called its offer meddling in a 
country‘s internal affairs. The effect was that domestic actors frustrated the efforts of 
external actors—and they often did in Kenya—even when the external actors had 
power over the country by virtue of their financial position.  
 
This incident shows how domestic forces and considerations can frustrate the 
efforts of the IFIs, though it does not necessarily mean that external forces have no 
influence at all. The Moi government complained about ―outside forces‖ having been 
behind ―unconstitutional bills‖ being ―pushed [on] the government‖ and pledged to 
resist those forces, referencing the IFIs as those forces (Kamau 2001:3). Therefore, 
there is no doubt about the reach of the IFIs to influence parliamentary debate around 
reforms, but having that kind of influence does not necessarily translate into 
―causing‖ actual reforms. In order to actually assess which type of actors—internal 
or external—can bring more effective influence or pressure to bear in moving a 
country toward reform, it is best for scholars to take a micro-level approach to the 
analysis. A micro-level approach involving interviews with activists, experts, and 
participants on the ground enables one to better understand how what may have 
seemed to be minor events had major consequences on the behavior of the state. 
Such an analytical approach would help answer questions about the extent to which 
externally imposed conditionality, the primary mechanism through which IFIs‘ 





6.2 Limits of External Influence and Aid Suspension 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters of this dissertation, Kenya had IFI 
conditionality imposed in a number of areas, both political and economic. 
Conditionality terms alone had no significant impact on the reform process. When 
domestic actors were involved in pressuring the government, however, there was 
movement toward reform. 
 
IFI pressure for reforms under President Moi throughout the 1980s did not 
result in any significant policy changes. In most cases, there seemed to be agreement 
on the need for reform, or some reforms would be initiated, but the government 
would renege, causing suspension of support from IFIs or Parliament would pass 
reform measures but there would be little or no implementation of the laws. This 
pattern went on for over ten years. Threats and suspension of financial aid by the 
IFIs did not improve the prospect for policy implementation. Part of the reason 
threats of aid suspension were not effective was because Kenya could always find 
financial assistance elsewhere, as donors had conflicting interests and often sent 
conflicting signals as to the seriousness of their threats. Press (2004) sought to make 
this same point when he argued that the IFIs and donor countries failed to leverage 






The donors as a whole failed to use their aid leverage for reforms 
collectively except for a dramatic moment in November 1991. 
Otherwise they sent conflicting signals to the regime which in turn 
attempted to play the game well enough with concessions aimed at 




Even the ―dramatic moment‖ in late 1991 was not the primary force pushing 
President Moi to concede to reform. The donors committed to suspend $350 million, 
but the actual amount suspended was only $115 million, less than a third of the 
amount threatened.
14
 For that year, the suspended aid amounted to only a 12 percent 
reduction from the previous year. It is a reasonable argument to make that the 
amount of funds suspended was not such that it would have a significant impact on 
the conduct of the government.  
 
Kenya‘s refusal to comply with the demands of the IFIs was reflected in the 
number of times that its financial aid packages were suspended: at least two 
suspensions for non-compliance in each decade from 1980 to 2000. When aid was 
suspended in 1991, it took two years before another agreement could be reached. 
After a suspension in 1997, it took another three years of negotiation for a new 
package; and as Press (2005) puts it, ―[h]ad the funding issue been pivotal, the 
regime would likely have moved swiftly to meet the demands of the donors, which 
                                                 
14Development aid to Kenya in 1991 totaled US$1.1 billion. In 1992, it was US$987 million, for a 




were primarily economic, not political in 1991‖ (14). Further suspensions followed 
within months after the new arrangements.  
 
The frequency of aid suspension would be surprising if a country‘s embrace 
of reform were indeed linked to receiving development financial assistance. In 
Kenya‘s case, however, whatever leverage the IFIs had, it was not independent of 
stronger, more influential domestic factors. Throughout those years, the government 
was rebuked by the IFIs but there was no strong call from the IFIs for significant 
political and economic reform. It was not until after domestic actors rose against 
deteriorating internal conditions that President Moi conceded to calls for reform.  
Less than a year after the attempted coup, for example—a coup that the plotters 
claimed was a response to government corruption—the government initiated both 
political and market reforms by lifting controls on investors. After popular protests in 
1989 and 1990, the government launched political and market reform by divesting of 
parastatals.   
 
 
6.3 Resilience of Domestic Factors: Customary Land Rights 
 
The limit of external influence was also apparent in the issue of 
individualized property rights. The IFIs had some influence in promoting 




since the 1950s under similar assumptions to those of the Swynnerton Plan 
(assumptions that individual free-holding property rights would induce economic 
growth through increased credit, increased investment in agriculture because of land 
tenure security, and the increase in land area controlled by the most efficient 
farmers). As in the colonial period, these benefits did not materialize because of 
ethnic traditions, as some of these assumptions could not be fully practiced. The 
assumptions failed because the IFIs neglected to consider the durability of customary 
traditions in the ethnic communities. The assumed benefits of individual free-holding 
rights were not sufficient to override customary tribal traditions and tribal 
communities continued to practice communal land tenure (property) rights. 
Attempting to institute a liberalizing system led to direct confrontation with tribal 
traditions (Kieyah and Kameri-Mbote 2010).  
 
This contradiction between customary and legal land rights resulted in 
confrontation among ethnic communities in post-colonial Kenya. Land disputes were 
the outcome of the system that created land markets where affluent members of 
different communities could acquire land in other‘s traditional areas, effectively 
negating the customary land rights practiced among virtually all ethnic groups in 
Kenya. Under an authoritarian one-party system, the state contained such conflict 
until it could no longer manage it, as agitation for political reform intensified in the 
early 1990s. Ethnic violence over land and other political rights occurred in the 




District in 1997 between the Maasai and Gusii. This type of ethnic violence 
continued up to the last presidential election in 2007. Maina Kiai, Chairman of 
Kenya‘s National Commission on Human Rights, explained the root cause of ethnic 
violence was land. The Kenyatta government failed to returned ex-settlers land to 
tribes who originally lived in some areas in the Rift Valley and their resentment 
against Kenyatta‘s tribe, the Kikuyu, persists to today (Gettleman 2008).  
 
There were also reform assumptions that did not materialize simply due to 
the nature of agriculture, especially as it relates to smallholdings. The assumption 
that individualized land tenure would induce increased credit to farmers failed to 
materialize because it did not take into account that credit agencies would be 
reluctant to issue credit to small farmers because of the high risks involved in such 
an investment in Kenya‘s ethnically divided society. A willing purchaser would have 
difficulty obtaining credit to buy land, as credit agencies would have difficulty 
foreclosing on properties in the event of default because of the prevalence of 
customary tenure. In short, the benefits of individualized land rights did not 
materialize because of a disconnect between its objectives and the actual practices on 
the ground (Kieyah and Kameri-Mbote 2010).  
 
This domestic reality was not something that IFI conditionality could have 
influenced in a way that would make it conducive to reform. Recognizing the 




directive aimed at requiring family members and title-holders to enter into agreement 
prior to any sale or the use of land as collateral. How these agreements would be 
enforced and how they would be verified was not clear. ―Under such circumstances,‖ 
as Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) put it, ―it is not surprising that there is little supply 
of land-secured credit, and those who do receive such credit frequently pull political 
strings or have access to substantial off-farm income‖ (5). Domestic actors are more 
likely to be the primary actors in reforming such a customary land tenure system. 
 
 
6.4 Effects of Colonialism and Ethnic Politics 
 
The way in which colonial administrators manipulated ethnic interests to 
govern Kenya set a precedent that has affected the way in which Kenya has been 
governed since independence. Post-colonial Kenyan leaders learned how policies of 
the colonial administrators benefited settlers and their commercial supporters. They, 
too, adopted policies that favored their ethnic groups and their allies. It may be that 
some individuals in particular ethnic groups believed in liberalization, or at least 
professed to, but they believed in it within the context of ethnic politics. These 
leaders have catered to their ethnic groups, and when a leader of a tribe takes control 
of the state, the inclination is to establish systems that favor his/her tribal 
communities (Amutabi 2009). This does not mean that all other groups were 




received a disproportionate share of public positions and resources. Statistics 
provided in this dissertation show this was the case under both Kenyatta and Moi.  
 
The way in which President Moi used ethnic politics to create a financial 
crisis, which in turn allowed him to further marginalize the Kikuyu business elites, is 
an indication of the power of domestic actors and factors in influencing reform. In 
retaliation, influential members of the Kikuyu community joined the opposition 
against the Moi government. This confrontation between the Kikuyu business and 
political elites and President Moi resulted in increased government repression of 
political opposition, which in turn further heightened popular protests against the 
government. By the summer and fall of 1990, the agitation for reform had reached a 
peak, leading to increased protests, which were followed by increased use of force by 
the government against the protestors (Lehman 1992). Seeing the level of domestic 
unrest, the IFIs decided to support the protestors. The indicator of their support was 
their announcement of aid cancellation to the Moi government. All of these pressure 
points eventually forced President Moi to concede to reform. 
 
Just as the consequences of harmful colonial policies and practices led to 
protests and rebellion, so too did the policies of Moi and his government. Economic 
hardship and political repression, infused with tribal resentment, led people to the 
streets to demand political and economic reforms. Protests over economic malaise 




government security forces were complicit in the murder of Foreign Minister Robert 
Ouko. Soon, university faculty associations and leaders of civic society organizations 
joined the protests. By the end of July 1990, President Moi agreed to political party 
reform, starting with his ruling KANU party. Among the major complaints against 
him were tribal favoritism, political corruption, and too much concentration of 
power. This domestic pressure for reform, and the government‘s initial consideration 
of reform measures, were the beginning of political liberalization in Kenya and the 
catalyst for the announcement of broader reforms the following year. Contrary to IFI 
pressure, these events show that it was internal popular protests that kick-started 
efforts for reform (Legovini 2002). 
 
Reforms were influenced more by the efforts of domestic actors and the 
general context of domestic politics, including the existence long historical rivalry 
among Kenya‘s politically important ethnic groups. Domestic actors, through 
protests and various forms of public pressure, were able to create space to challenge 
President Moi and his ruling KANU party. Even though popular pressures forced 
KANU leaders to claim that they believed in reform, as they had pledged to the IFIs, 
they did all they could to maintain their authority to safeguard the status quo. This 
was to be expected, as reforms entailed the opening of political and economic spaces 






The political and economic reforms in Kenya cannot be fully understood 
outside the entrenched historical rivalry among Kenya‘s three politically important 
ethnic groups: the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, and Luo. Political and economic reforms under 
President Moi up to 1992 were attempts to alter the direction of or completely 
reverse policies that were implemented in the 1960s and 1970s under the Kenyatta 
government. President Moi sought reforms that would weaken Kikuyu advantages 
and increase those of the Kalenjin and his allies. He took advantage of IFI financial 
support in many instances in the 1980s but carried out little to no externally imposed 
reform. Areas that would have had adverse implications for his power were never 
reformed in the way that the IFIs wanted. The National Cereal and Produce Board 
(NCPB), for example, which the IFIs wanted privatized since the early 1980s, did 
not see any reform until 1992 because the NCPB was an effective mechanism for 
President Moi to channel largesse to supporters, especially Kalenjins, in the 
agricultural sector (S. Ambrose, personal correspondence, February 15, 2012). It was 
not until his political power was threatened in 1990 by popular protests that President 
Moi conceded to political reforms. 
 
 
6.5 Implications of Domestic-Actor Focused Study for Reform 
 
Through a domestic-focused explanation for Kenya‘s (often reluctant) 




Kenya was limited, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the design and 
implementation of reform and development programs, a contribution that has policy 
relevance both for developing countries and for international financial institutions. 
Kenya‘s persistent non-compliance with IFI conditionalities while at the same time 
achieving real progress toward reform points to the influence of a number of 
domestic actors and conditions—including the nature of ethnic division and politics 
influenced by a legacy of colonialism—that donors in the future should consider in 
their reform program blueprints. In designing reform policies and programs, all 
efforts should be made to understand how each project would affect different ethnic 
group.  
 
A micro-level analysis that elucidates the role that popular protests and 
resentment had in forcing President Moi to concede to reform affirms the importance 
of these factors and leads to a recommendation that the international financial 
institutions consult with domestic activists from all sectors as part of their 
engagement with governments on any reform initiative. This recommendation is very 
important for two reasons. First, if development policies are to be successful, all of 
the internal actors must be fully involved in all stages of the policy process – 
planning, designing, and implementation – because ultimately these actors are 
primary in determining the extent to which policies are implemented. Second and 





APPENDIX A:  
LOCATING KENYA: MAPS AND CURRENT STATISTICS 
 
 The former colony of Great Britain is located in East Africa and borders 
Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Somalia. Kenya is more than twice the size of the 
U.S. state of Nevada with a total area of 580,367 square kilometers. It currently has a 
population of 43 millions growing at a rate of 2.44 percent making Kenya is the 31
st. 
most populated country in the world, between Tanzania and Argentina. Life 
expectancy at birth is 63.07 years (male: 61.62; female: 64.55) with a median age of 
18.9 years.
15
 The maps below provide more details about Kenya‘s territorial 
characteristics. 
 
Administratively, Kenya is divided into seven provinces and the area of Nairobi. 
The country adopted a new constitution promulgated in August 2010, which 
―designates 47 yet-to-be-defined counties as first-order administrative units‖ (CIA 
Factbook 2012). The new constitution also abolishes the position of prime minister 
and establishes a bicameral legislature. Many of the provisions in the new 
constitutions have yet to be finalized and will not probably be enforced during the 
next administration. The next presidential election was supposed to be held in the fall 
of this year, but there is news that it has been postponed until March 2013.  
 
 
                                                 
15 United States Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. The World Factbook (Washington, D.C.).                   
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>. Accessed on 























 Appendix B: Selected Events under President Moi 




1982  Kenya's National Assembly declares 
KANU Kenya‘s the sole legal party. 
Press censorship and political 
detentions increase.  
 
 Attempted coup d‘état in August led 
by a Luo officer in the Kenyan Air 
Force. Oginga Odinga accused of being 
involved in the plot and placed under 
house arrest. 
 
 Creation of the 
Central Bank of Kenya. 
 
 Change in exchange 
rate regime (fixed to 
crawling). 




1984  Increased anti-government protests, 
including emergence of dissident 
student groups. 
 Severe drought caused 









1986  Student protests and public education 
campaigns increased. Parliamentarians 
critical of the government arrested and 
accused of being connected to 
Mwakenya, a leftist movement. 
 
 Vote by secret ballot replaced with 
"queue" voting where voters stand in 
lines marked for their choice of 
candidate. This was an attempt to 
intimidate people from voting against 
the government.  
 
 Consolidation of executive power. 
Parliament passed a constitutional 
amendment to increase the president's 
power over the civil service and the 
judiciary. 
 
 Coffee boom. This 
helped the government 
to reduce its budget 
deficit. 
 World Bank 
disbursed two 




and $13.2 million 
agricultural sector 
management 








1988  Moi dissolved the National Assembly 
and released some political prisoners. 
Moi re-elected president and many 
opposition leaders arrested.  
 
 Constitution amended in July granting 
the executive branch the power to 
dismiss judges as well as extending 
legal authority to detain without trial to 
14 days (from 24 hours). 
 
  World Bank 
approved more 
sectorial loans to 
Kenya 
1989 Minister Kenneth Mabita forced to 
resign for criticizing the result of the 
1988 election. Matiba became one of 
the leaders of the opposition movement 
in 1990. 












1990  Opposition to KANU‘s single-party 
dominance intensified. In July, Charles 
Rubia, Matiba and Raila Odinga were 
arrested and detained without trial and 
their public "pro-democracy" rallies 
banned.  
 
 Protests in the Central Province. 
Government-sponsored review of 
KANU in a one-party system. Public 
discontent with the government and 
KANU increased. In August, Oginga 
Odinga and six prominent opposition 
leaders, form the Forum for Restoration 
of Democracy (FORD), a coalition of 
different (multi-ethnic) opposition 
groups.  
 Kenya operating 
under a dual exchange 
rate system. 
 
  Kenya‘s Central 




banks were allowed to 
determine fees and 
interest rates on their 
loans.  






1991  Moi accepted demands for political 
pluralism. 
 
 The National Assembly amended the 
constitution to allow for multi-party 
elections and made it a requirement that 
presidential candidates win at least 25% 
of the vote in at least five of the eight 
provinces, in addition to an overall 
plurality. The president was given the 
authority to appoint all (11) members of 
the Electoral Commission 
  International 
donors announced 
suspension of 
$350 million in 
quick-disbursing 
loans from the 
IMF.  
 







1992  Establishment of more new political 
parties. Mwai Kibaki's Democratic 
Party, Odinga's FORD, and other 
smaller parties such as the Social 
Democratic Party, the Kenya National 
Democratic Alliance, the People's 
Union of Justice and New Order and 
Islamic Party of Kenya.  
 
 FORD organized first legal opposition 
rally in over 20 years. Civil unrest 
broke out in the west central region. 
Kalenjin warriors attack Kisii tea 
farmers, disrupting tea production. 
Outbreaks of violence continued to 
mount over the following two years, 
seeming to confirm the government's 
predictions that multi-party politics 
would exacerbate ethnic tension and 
eventually splinter the country along 
tribal lines. Opposition parties accused 
the government of inciting the violence. 
Estimated 2,300 people dead and 
25,000 displaced. 
 
 In March women protesters attacked 
by police with tear gas and batons 
during a hunger strike to liberate 
political prisoners. Demonstrations in 
Kisumu, Odinga's stronghold, and the 
western town of Homa Bay. New 
 Goldenberg 
scandal:Businessman 
Kamlesh Pattni and 
then-permanent 
secretary in the Ministry 
of Finance Wilfred 
Koinange allegedly 
exported nonexistent 
gold as part of a credit-
for-export program to 
help Kenya recover 
from the effects of the 
First Gulf War. The 
fraudulent scheme cost 
Kenya over 2 billion 





protests in Nairobi. 
 
  In the December elections, Moi won 
the December presidential election with 
36.35% of the votes (Kenneth Matiba 
takes 26%, Mwai Kibaki 19.45%, and 
Oginga Odinga 17.48%). Opposition 
won 88 out of 188 seats in Parliament. 
Opposition protested the election 
results, calling them invalid on the 
grounds of procedural irregularities, but 
observers did not think the irregularities 
merited annulments of the results. 
  
1993  President Moi sworn in on January 4, 
1993, for another five-year term. 
 Kenyan Shilling 




1994  FORD disintegrates into rival ethnic 
factions: FORD-Asili (Kikuyu), FORD-
Kenya (Luo and Abaluhya). 













2002 President Moi set to retire before the 
end of 2002. Constitutional review set 
to begin dialogue on a referendum on a 
new Constitution.  
 
 National Development Party (NDP) 
joined KANU. The opposition National 
Alliance for Change is formed 
comprising Mwai Kibaki's Democratic 
Party, the National Party of Kenya led 
by Charity Ngilu, and Ford-Kenya 
headed by Kijana Wamalwa, Saba Saba 
Asili and Ford-Asili. Smaller 
opposition alliance Ford-People/Safina 
comprises Ford-People's Simeon 
Nyachae and Paul Muite's Safina party. 
 Anti-corruption and 
Economic Crimes Bill 
failed to pass.  
 
 Government expands 
VAT to all goods and 
services. Minister of 
Agriculture announced 
end to Coffee Board of 
Kenya marketing 
practices and 90% 
retrenchment of its 
staff. 
  




                                                 


















Commodities Phase    
     
1964 C64 KTDA 2.2 79 
1968 C119 Tea II 0.1 5 
1974 L993 Tea Factory 10.4 100 
1977 L1389 S. Nyanza Sugar 25.0 100 
1978 L1636 Sugar Rehab 12.8 18 
1979 C914 SH Coffee I 10.5 39 
1982 C1237 Cotton 21.6 98 
1989 C2062 SH Coffee II 30* 82* 
Rural Dev’t  Phase    
1976 L1303/C650 IADP I 6.7 33 
1978 C858 Narok ADP 3.2 25 
1979 C959 IADP II 5.3 12 
Program Lend- ing Phase    
1982 C1277 Grains Ag. TA 6.0 100 
1986 C1717/AFO21 ASAO I 60.0 100 
1991 C2204 ASAO II 33.7 45 
Institutional Dev’t Phase    
1983 C1387 NEP I 14.5 97 
1986 C1718 ASMP I (NCPB) 13.2 115 
1987 C1758 Animal Health 11.4 76 
 C1849 NARP I 18.4 94 




1990 C2198 Forestry IV 10.5 76 
 C2199 NEP II 9 50* 
1992 C2445 ASMP II 8* 55* 
1993 C2460 Drought Recovery 12* 80 
1995 C2797 Arid Lands RMP 14* N/A 
1996 C2907 Lake Vic. EMP 8* N/A 
1997 C2935 NARP II 27* N/A 
Not Classified     
1968 C129 LS I 3.6 92 
1969 L641 Forest I 2.6 100 
1972 C105 SH Credit AFC 3.6 100 
 C344 SH Credit II AFC 6.0 100 
1974 C477 LS II 12.5 58 
1975 L1093/C537 Group Farms 5.2 35 
 L1132/C565 Forestry II 19.9 99 
1977 C692/L1390 Ag. Credit III 18.7 75 
 L1389 Bura Irrigation 34.9 87 
1979 C962 Baringo (SA) 4.0 62 
1980 C1051 Fisheries 0.2 2 
1981 L1995/C1443 Ag. Credit IV 
AFC 
35.0 100 
1982 L2098/C1213 Forestry III 24.6 66 
Source: (Bank 1998). * The full amount of the loan/credit and the percentage disbursed  






APPENDIX D: IMF/World Bank’s Arrangements with Kenya, 1980-2000 
 






1980 Stand-By Arrangement SDR 241.5 SDR 90 Remainder cancelled, 1982 
 Supplementary Facility SDR 184.8 SDR 50.1 Remainder cancelled, 1982 
1982 Supplementary Facility SDR 96.8 SDR 96.8  
 Supplementary Facility SDR 60.4 SDR 60.4  
1983 Stand-By Arrangement SDR 175.9 SDR 175.9  
1985 Stand-By Arrangement SDR 85.2 SDR 85.2  
1986 Compensatory Facility SDR 37.9 SDR 37.9  
1988 SAF Loan SDR 99.4 SDR 28.4 Replaced by ESAF, 1989 
1989 ESAF Loan SDR 241.4 SDR 216.2 Remainder suspended, 1992
17
 
1993 ESAF Loan  SDR 45.2 SDR 22.6  
1996 ESAF Loan SDR 149.6 SDR 24.9 Remainder suspended, 1997 
2000 PRGF Loan SDR 150 SDR 33.6  
Source: (IMF 2001; IMF 2008:18; O'Brien and Ryan 2001) 
  
  
                                                 






Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset created by the 
IMF and credited to member countries to supplement their existing reserve assets. 
The value of the SDR in U.S. dollar is calculated daily as the sum of the values in 
U.S. dollars of the four major currencies in the world, the Euro, U.S. dollar, Japanese 
yen, British pound sterling, based on exchange rates quoted at noon at the London 
Stock Exchange. The SDR exchange rate is posted daily on the IMF web site: 
www.imf.org.  Countries that have been granted SDRs have to exchange them for 
currencies from other members of the IMF with enough reserves to perform the 
exchange. 
 
Compensatory and Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF) provides 
contingency loans to member countries experiencing temporary export shortfalls. 
The CCFF also helps countries finance excess costs of cereal imports resulted from 
circumstances beyond the members' control. In other words, this facility assists 
members with financial aid arrangements to protect themselves from unexpected, 
adverse external developments. In the case of Kenya, the 1986 compensatory loan 
was to help the country respond to its need of maize crises caused by a major 
drought started in 1983. 
 
 
Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) are described as the ―workhorse‖ in IMF 




experiencing balance-of-payment problems. Rates are non-concessional, which 
means they carry an interest rates, although the rates are most often than not lower 
than what countries would be charged by private markets. Kenya received three 
stand-by loans in the first part of the 1980s totaling more than SDR 351 million. 
 
The Supplementary Financing Facility was established in 1980 as a subsidy 
account to help reduce the costs of financing incurred by eligible developing 
countries. Countries use this subsidy to help cover periodic changes that they would 
have made to the IMF General Resource Account. Kenya received such subsidy in 
1980, but most of the fund had to be suspended because the IMF and Kenya could 
not agree on the kind of reforms that the country should undertake. 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) loans were concessional loans given to 
low-income member countries facing protracted balance-of-payments assistance. 
These were typically joint loans with the World Bank and other lenders and were 
conditioned on the recipient countries agreeing to undertake structural reform. Kenya 
received one SAF loan, as the facility was being converted and extended to the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) from 1987 and 1993. 
ESAF loans were similar to SAF loans but with broader terms and prospects 
to higher amounts. As successor to the SAF, it had similar objective, eligibility, and 
―program features, but differed in scope, terms of access, and funding sources.‖ In 
1999, ESAF was replaced with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). 




flexibility in considering social spending to reduce poverty. In other words, the IMF 





                                                 
18 For more on these types of arrangements, see the respective IMF Factsheet and “IMF 
Lending” Factsheet at www.imf.org; also Encyclopedia of Nations at 
<http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The-International-
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